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Jules Holroyd |
Blog on delusional beliefs, distorted memories, confabulatory explanations, unrealistically optimistic predictions, and implicit biases.
Thursday, 30 May 2013
Implicit Cognitions and Responsibility
Monday, 27 May 2013
Realism and Creativity as Epistemic Benefits
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Magdalena Antrobus |
Wednesday, 22 May 2013
Delusions as Malfunctioning Beliefs
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Kengo Miyazono with Charles Darwin |
The aim of this project is to present and develop a new strategy to defend doxasticism about delusion from the main argument against it. Doxasticism about delusion is the view that delusions are beliefs.
Although this view is widely accepted in psychiatry, there is a simple but powerful philosophical argument against it. I call it “the argument from causal role”.
- Playing a belief-like causal role is necessary for a mental state to be a belief.
- Many delusions fail to play belief-like causal roles.
- Therefore, many delusions are not beliefs.
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