tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post2615073085873178356..comments2024-03-22T22:09:09.407+00:00Comments on Imperfect Cognitions: Implicit Bias and Epistemic Innocence: ImplicationsKengo Miyazonohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01643685718519136099noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-84683663210109291472014-06-13T10:12:20.142+01:002014-06-13T10:12:20.142+01:00I confess I haven't read Holroyd's paper, ...I confess I haven't read Holroyd's paper, but here's an initial reaction to your post: I wonder if her argument against responsibility *does* amount to an argument against the satisfaction of the NRA condition if the 'cognition' we focus on is the belief formation process, rather than the belief (i.e. output of a process.)<br /><br />She seems to be saying that a belief formation process unduly influenced by implicit biases is one to which relevant alternatives *are* available, by way of "other cognitive processes...over which we plausibly have control". If this is true, it seems strange to me to say that (e.g.) a sexist belief which I hold is one to which no relevant alternative is available for me, since (ex hypothesi) it was within my power to form my beliefs differently such that my sexist bias wouldn't have infected them.<br /><br />More generally, I wonder whether it might be helpful to distinguish biased belief formation processes from their results as candidates for epistemic innocence. Chris Lethebyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17918379717957141913noreply@blogger.com