tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post2303275423208991250..comments2024-03-22T22:09:09.407+00:00Comments on Imperfect Cognitions: Religious Beliefs? Kengo Miyazonohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01643685718519136099noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-77570532237218331302014-01-17T22:19:51.088+00:002014-01-17T22:19:51.088+00:00Yes, thank you very much Lisa!Yes, thank you very much Lisa!anna_ichinohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01607613012329322603noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-51520605723158991792014-01-17T19:06:19.660+00:002014-01-17T19:06:19.660+00:00Hi Anna
We are thinking of imperfect cognitions a...Hi Anna<br /><br />We are thinking of imperfect cognitions as beliefs, memories, etc. that have obvious epistemic faults. For instance, they may be inaccurate in some important respect. Good examples are distorted memories or delusional beliefs. Some imperfect cognitions may be epistemically irrational (e.g., beliefs supported by weak evidence or irresponsive to counterevidence), but irrationality is not necessarily a condition for imperfect cognitions.<br /><br />Does this help?<br />LisaLisa Bortolotti https://www.blogger.com/profile/00976016764033246051noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-85342706712027294312014-01-17T18:07:51.218+00:002014-01-17T18:07:51.218+00:00Thank you Ema. These are very interesting question...Thank you Ema. These are very interesting questions, which make me realizing one point I should clarify in my discussion, and one clarification I’d like to ask you about the Project. <br /><br />The point I should clarify is that nothing of what I say about religious beliefs implies that they are false. What I argue is they’re not beliefs (but imaginings); while I don’t have any argument for the inexistence of God! If God exists, religious imaginings would turn out to be true. <br />Also: you say that I identify epistemic pitfalls of religious cognitions, and I wonder (really, not rhetorically!) whether this is true... I’d say that insofar as they’re imaginings and not beliefs (something that, admittedly, I haven’t demonstrated yet) – and insofar as they’re recognized as such, they are not epistemically defective. Indeed, as you write, in such case the question whether subjects are epistemically blameworthy would make little (or no) sense. Or maybe one might (in some circumstances) be blameworthy for allowing imaginings to play a big role in her cognitive economy, since – if one is not epistemically vigilant enough – this might end up having influences on her beliefs (for example in the way Greg and I discuss in our previous post). I should think about this!<br /><br />My clarification question concerns the notion of imperfect cognitions. How precisely you define them? Has the imperfection here in question to do only with irrationality (epistemic/procedural/agential)? I mean, roughly, could we substitute ‘imperfect’ with ‘irrational’? Also: are the cognitions in question just beliefs? Or can, for example, also an acceptance be ‘imperfect’? I’d say it can, but not really sure. <br />Sorry, maybe the answers to these questions are obvious and I’m just confused now – don’t feel you have to reply here if you haven’t time! Hopefully we’ll have time to talk at the workshop!<br />anna_ichinohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01607613012329322603noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-52004217161515106182014-01-17T15:38:05.235+00:002014-01-17T15:38:05.235+00:00To echo Anna: nothing she says here is incompatibl...To echo Anna: nothing she says here is incompatible with the claim that cognitions with religious content have pragmatic benefits. What's especially interesting from the point of view of the Epistemic Innocence Project Anna, is whether these cognitions have epistemic benefits, despite the epistemic pitfalls you identify. And also whether these beliefs are ones for which the agent is epistemically blameworthy. (If you think they are better characterized as imaginings that second question may not make sense.)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-50615127025187031602014-01-17T15:29:46.871+00:002014-01-17T15:29:46.871+00:00Anyway, I don't even think that such effects ...Anyway, I don't even think that such effects are always beneficial: religious thoughts might also generate anxieties and worries (feelings of guilt, fear of God's punishment...).anna_ichinohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01607613012329322603noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-9030937288045437022014-01-17T15:27:34.144+00:002014-01-17T15:27:34.144+00:00Thanks Graham. Sure: I agree they might be valuabl...Thanks Graham. Sure: I agree they might be valuable for that reason – as well as for many others indeed. My focus here was on the epistemic status of religious (so-called) beliefs: I argued that “belief” might not be the best epistemic category to describe them. With this I didn’t mean to suggest that they are not /cannot be beneficial for people who endorse them. Indeed, I think that also mental states other than beliefs – such as imaginings – can have emotional (and behavioural) effects, more or less beneficial. anna_ichinohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01607613012329322603noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-61842356084430804402014-01-17T14:40:02.441+00:002014-01-17T14:40:02.441+00:00Aren't religious beliefs valuable in avoiding ...Aren't religious beliefs valuable in avoiding having to think about ending when we die? It's easier just to have 'faith' than contemplate oblivion, making it beneficial. Personally I prefer oblivion, but I can sympathise. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14428480573695906728noreply@blogger.com