tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post4906211441433278695..comments2024-03-22T22:09:09.407+00:00Comments on Imperfect Cognitions: Towards a Theory of 'Adaptive Rationality'?Kengo Miyazonohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01643685718519136099noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-5864130396034096582014-12-10T17:10:13.822+00:002014-12-10T17:10:13.822+00:00Thank you both for the comments and the links! Thank you both for the comments and the links! Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06825903799644247843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-30234520398135479702014-12-09T14:15:57.895+00:002014-12-09T14:15:57.895+00:00Of course! So now you know I qualify as a "la...Of course! So now you know I qualify as a "lazy lurker": haven't read your latest paper yet, but I certainly will. Sergio Graziosihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07571218856690513933noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-12091833302937822562014-12-09T13:40:03.323+00:002014-12-09T13:40:03.323+00:00Thank you both, Andrea and Sergio!
Yes, I'm ...Thank you both, Andrea and Sergio! <br /><br />Yes, I'm aware of the excellent paper by McKay and Dennett, and rely heavily on it for my account of the epistemic benefits of motivated delusions: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810014001937<br /><br />I was not aware of the other source and I'll look it up!<br />Lisa Bortolotti https://www.blogger.com/profile/00976016764033246051noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-74855515727448264972014-12-09T13:33:39.653+00:002014-12-09T13:33:39.653+00:00Lisa and Andrea,
since you started trading interes...Lisa and Andrea,<br />since you started trading interesting links in the topic, I'll stop lurking and add a couple of my own. I expect you both to be well aware of the first, but probably not the second, so overall I guess the following is more for the benefit of interested readers.<br /><br />All right, the first link refers to:<br />McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009). The evolution of misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(06), 493-510.<br />The whole issue (main article, all peer comments and final response) is available here: http://beyond-belief.org.uk/sites/beyond-belief.org.uk/files/The%20evolution%20of%20misbelief.pdf<br />Well worth a read, in my opinion. The conclusion is that systematic misbeliefs may be positively selected when, to use Lisa's words, they are a case of "unrealistic optimism". In such circumstances, misbeliefs can be consistently adaptive. Rings a bell?<br /><br />Second, there is also an intriguing approach to formally model a very similar situation with the tools of game theory, the full ref is:<br />Kaznatcheev, A., Montrey, M., & Shultz, T. R. (2014). Evolving useful delusions: Subjectively rational selfishness leads to objectively irrational cooperation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.0041. And can be found here: http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0041<br />Plenty of discussions are available on Kaznatcheev (et al) blog: http://egtheory.wordpress.com/<br />In particular, you may want to start from https://egtheory.wordpress.com/2013/07/09/evolving-useful-delusions-to-promote-cooperation/ and perhaps https://egtheory.wordpress.com/2014/05/04/useful-delusions-interface-theory-of-perception-and-religion/<br />What Kaznatcheev et al are showing is a specific case where over-optimistic "beliefs" are selected for in a formal simulation of competitive, spatially-constrained games (what interactions can occur is regulated by where the agents are). The effect of inclusive fitness lurks in there, I believe.<br /><br />Conclusion: according to the two approaches I'm considering, and at least on paper, over-optimistic beliefs can be adaptive. Whether this calls for a radical rethink of what we consider rational or not I can't say: all I see is that the picture we have is complicated, and I'm tempted to dismiss Rationality (with capital R) as yet another (scientific) fetish.Sergio Graziosihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07571218856690513933noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-69939719320357777692014-12-09T11:53:22.040+00:002014-12-09T11:53:22.040+00:00Thank you very much for your interest!
While the ...Thank you very much for your interest!<br /><br />While the term ‘success’ is often taken to refer to practical success only (achieving one’ s desires), excluding cognitive aims and standards, I follow adaptive rationality theorists and take ‘success’ to refer not only to the fulfillment of desires and prudential goals, but also to the achievement of epistemic goals.<br /><br />Now, as far as I understand, adaptive rationality theorists do assume that making empirically accurate predictions is generally conducive to success (both evolutionary and agential success). I also believe that this is controversial, though, as there seem to be cases where inaccurate beliefs can further some of our goals. Now, these cases seem to be at odds with their claim that empirically accurate beliefs are adaptive. At the same time, these cases offer an argument that adaptive rationality theorists can use to attack mainstream research on cognitive biases and irrationality. Specifically, it can be argued that flawed self-assessments (e.g. better-than-the average effect, unrealistic optimism) are after all cases of adaptive behaviour and, therefore, of adaptive rationality. <br /><br />As far as I am aware, adaptive rationality theorists do not discuss these effects very often (but there are a few interesting papers: http://pss.sagepub.com/content/23/12/1515 ). Other researchers working on biased cognition and adaptive behavior have looked in more detail at the potential benefits these families of effects/biases could offer. For instance, when talking about overconfidence, Dominic Johnson (http://dominicdpjohnson.com/publications/articles.html) points to the a ‘lottery effect’: even though overconfidence might be lead to worse performance, overconfident people also get engaged more often in activities than unbiased people, therefore buying more lottery tickets in the competition for success. <br /><br />While it might be tempting to reinterpret such biases/flawed self-assessments as instances of adaptive behaviour, it seems to me that there are some problems with this move. In the main, as Dunning et al. (2004; https://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/heath/documents/PSPI%20-%20Biased%20Self%20Views.pdf ) make clear, flawed self-assessments may not be that innocent or beneficial. In fact, these may also lead to undesirable life outcomes, for instance influencing people’s efforts to obtain health care or making people more likely to engage in high-risk sex. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06825903799644247843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-59085660881117590262014-12-06T21:17:21.413+00:002014-12-06T21:17:21.413+00:00Hi Andrea and thank you for such an interesting po...Hi Andrea and thank you for such an interesting post. <br /><br />I was wondering whether in your work you distinguish epistemic rationality from agential success. One of the implications of the fast-and-frugal framework as I understand it is that epistemic rationality and agential success substantially overlap. But there are many circumstances in which we seem to have true and justified beliefs that do not do us any good (e.g., depressive realism), or false and unjustified beliefs that further our goals (e.g., unrealistic optimism). <br /><br />What's your take on these cases? Would unrealistic optimism be a case of adaptive irrationality?Lisa Bortolotti https://www.blogger.com/profile/00976016764033246051noreply@blogger.com