tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post6517525740850224692..comments2024-03-22T22:09:09.407+00:00Comments on Imperfect Cognitions: A Case of Knowledge Based Upon False BeliefKengo Miyazonohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01643685718519136099noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-10239663513508260952014-12-06T21:05:29.235+00:002014-12-06T21:05:29.235+00:00That’s a nice thought and question. I’m not sure t...That’s a nice thought and question. I’m not sure that it follows that for *any* , someone can come to know P via Q, but I don’t see that there is any theoretical reason why not. At the same time, I do think that there still is a justification condition on knowledge, and so someone who reasons, improperly, that 9 is the smallest prime number, and then that proposition is used in the service of gaining the truth that P, doesn’t know that P. And if someone reasons properly that 9 is the smallest prime number (say, a child is taught by a normally reliable but in this instance lying adult that 9 is the smallest prime) but then reasons improperly from that to P, then the person doesn’t know that P. So in order for someone to know P via Q, the environment would have to be such that the evidence to the agent really does support P. One can imagine a case where such a child is also told that the contact will be at the station when, if one takes the smallest prime as a PM hour and then subtract five hours from it, then I think the child may just know that P if the kid can do the subtraction. So there does have to be some relation between P and Q, presumably, since P has to be able to justify Q (in light of some other background beliefs). Avram Hillerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07480593838296907925noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4430111450575356526.post-84884591133673290832014-12-02T22:43:51.125+00:002014-12-02T22:43:51.125+00:00Does it follow then that for any pair of propositi...Does it follow then that for any pair of propositions < P, Q > where P is true & Q is false, there is some possible environment E such that an agent in E believing both that P and that Q could come to know that P via her falsely believing that Q?<br /><br />Or does the operative notion of Environment you employ separate out some subset of propositions (e.g., necessarily false) or require any such pair stand in a certain relation to one another (e.g., entailment or identity with respect to some coarse/fine grained individuation of the relevant states of affairs)?<br /><br />For example, suppose:<br />P= The contact will be at the train station at 4pm<br />Q= 9 is the smallest prime number<br />Does your view at least in principle allow for there to be some E such that an agent can come to know that P via her falsely believing that Q? Or does being conducive to the formation of true beliefs make it the case that for there to be some such E requires a certain relation hold between the state of affairs described in P and that described in Q (broadly/narrowly construed): e.g., those having to do with the Milan-train, specifically its time of arrival and the identity of one its passengers (with primes or size comparisons thereof presumably not being among those)? Saoirse1916https://www.blogger.com/profile/16622690434639061818noreply@blogger.com