Kengo Miyazono with Charles Darwin I am a research fellow at University of Birmingham and a JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) fellow. My main research area is philosophy of mind, broadly construed (including philosophy of psychology, philosophy of psychiatry and early modern philosophy of mind). Recently, I am working on a project which is, directly or indirectly, related to epistemic innocence project. The aim of this project is to present and develop a new strategy to defend doxasticism about delusion from the main argument against it. Doxasticism about delusion is the view that delusions are beliefs. Although this view is widely accepted in psychiatry, there is a simple but powerful philosophical argument against it. I call it “the argument from causal role”. - Playing a belief-like causal role is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. - Many delusions fail to play belief-like causal roles. - Therefore, many delusions are not beliefs.
A blog at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and mental health