Imperfect Cognitions

This post is by  Martina Rosola . Martina is a researcher in Philosophy of Language. Her main interest is the role of language in systems of injustice and how it can serve to either perpetuate or dismantle them. Within this perspective, she specialized in gender-fair language. Martina Rosola Evaluating gender-fair strategies in Italian Do you want to avoid the masculine generic and struggle to choose among the many gender-fair alternatives? This post is for you. Gender-fair language strategies abound and greatly differ from one another: some are hard for the reader, others for the writer; some aim to better represent women, others focus on non-binary people. But which one is “the best”? Being a philosopher, I cannot but reply “it depends”. If you have a word limit, visibility strategies, which repeat the masculine words in the feminine too (e.g., “lui o lei”, he or she), are counter-suggested. Innovative neutrality strategies substitute masculine words with neologisms (e.g., “lai”,...

This post is by Grace Lockrobin, Co-director of Thoughtful. Resources for Philosophy for Children Over the past few years, the charity established in 1992 as SAPERE, has undergone a metamorphosis. Our members and stakeholders agreed that we needed a new name that captures our commitment to the kind of dialogue that takes ideas seriously and treats interlocutors sensitively. In short, thoughtful dialogue. It turns out that our new name was staring us in the face. We are pleased to share Thoughtful’s  new website , a refreshed digital space that we hope better articulates (and facilitates) our work in Philosophy for Children and Communities (P4C).  Thoughtful new website Thoughtful has spent more than three decades supporting philosophical enquiry in schools and communities across the United Kingdom. The new site offers a clearer and more welcoming way to explore that work, while expressing the same mission and vision. At the centre of Thoughtful’s approach is a simple but strik...

This week's post is by Enara Garcia,  Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Postdoctoral Fellow at Department of Psychology, University of Southern Denmark.    Enara Garcia  In recent years, psychotherapy has become a central cultural reference point for understanding ourselves and regulating our distress. Yet the more therapy saturates public discourse, the more urgent it becomes to ask what kind of psychotherapy we actually need. I have been investigating therapeutic relationships from embodied perspectives for some years. What follows is a personal reflection on why psychotherapy needs a more critical, relational, and process‐sensitive orientation. A first step is rethinking what we mean by mental health . Rather than treating mental conditions as cognitive dysfunctions or biomedical pathologies, I understand mental health as our capacity to create not only meaningful worlds, but also worlds that are significant for us. This requires distinguishing meaning —the content o...

This week's post is by Shao-Pu Kang, a n assistant professor at National Tsing-Hua University, Graduate Institute of Philosophy,  his recent publication Against an Epistemic Argument for Mineness in Review of Philosophy and Psychology .    Shao-Pu Kang  Suppose you see a sunrise. You are thrilled, feel a chill in the air, hear your inner voice saying “that’s magnificent,” imagine enjoying the view with your best friend, and think about your loved one. As you undergo these mental states, do you experience them as yours, even be fore you turn your attention to and reflect on them? This question lies at the heart of live debates about whether experiences come with a built-in sense of ownership, often called mineness: a pre-reflective awareness of one’s experiences as one’s own. In “Against an Epistemic Argument for Mineness,” I critically examine Marie Guillot’s novel attempt to defend typicalism, the view that all ordinary experiences have mineness.  Guillot star...

This post is by Víctor Fernández Castro (University of Granada) and Miguel Núñez de Prado-Gordillo (University of Granada). It is based on their chapter “ Embodied, embedded, enactive, extended… and exclusionary? Toward an inclusive E-Cognition for cognitive diversity, ” published in Analytic Philosophy and 4E Cognition , which explores how 4E approaches can be made more inclusive of neurodiversity.  Víctor Fernández Castro (University of Granada) If, following Alice Crary and the political turn in analytic philosophy, one takes the conceptual and methodological to be political, then 4E Mental Health concepts express a range of political commitments. Some of these merit special attention in debates about how cognitive diversity and disability should be understood and recognized. In our chapter at Analytic Philosophy and 4E Cognition , this is exactly our goal: to critically examine 4E Mental Health from the lens of the Neurodiversity movement and its academic branch, the neurodiver...

This post is by Pablo Andrés López Silva (University of Valparaíso) and Miguel Núñez de Prado-Gordillo (University of Granada). It draws on their paper “A Roadmap to 4E Mental Health,” published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, where they develop a 4E (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) framework for understanding mental health and psychopathology.  Miguel Núñez de Prado-Gordillo  (University of Granada)       As a teenager, I (Miguel) spent a significant amount of my weekend nights compulsively collecting all the trash left in the parks where I used to get trashed with my friends. Back home, I would then spend some more time aligning all the stuff in my massively misaligned desk in straight angles. And I did so out of fear that a nasty, omnipotent Karmic force—whose existence I deemed almost certainly impossible—could hurt my then-partner in retaliation for my past misbehavior. Fortunately, I eventually escaped the grip of my Karmic ob...