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On the rationality of thought-insertion judgements

Today’s post is contributed by Víctor Verdejo. He is a philosopher of language and mind who has recently published the article “ On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments ”, now featuring in a special collection on delusions in Philosophical Psychology . Víctor Verdejo is currently a Ramón y Cajal fellow at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, and a member of Logos Research Group. Víctor Verdejo We often think of delusional experience as not particularly revealing with respect to a subject’s rationality. In this paper, I explore a different—some might say daring—approach: what if delusional experience were to illuminate the rational grounds associated with our judgments and concepts? In this work, I focus on the experience of thought-insertion and the first-person concept. Consider what I term the “rationality hypothesis”: this hypothesis holds that when subjects with schizophrenia report thought insertion, they may be expressing fully rational judgments about the ownership ...
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Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations

Today's post is by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (University of Marburg) and Christiana Werner (University of Duisburg-Essen) about their recently edited book, Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations (Routledge 2024). Recent approaches in philosophy of mind and epistemology have shown a growing interest in examining the nature of phenomenal knowledge and the epistemic value of having an experience. The basic idea in these debates has been that having an experience has a unique character and provides the experiencer with a kind of knowledge which otherwise cannot be achieved. As expressed by an ancient proverb: “Experience is the best teacher.” That there is a specific type of knowledge we can only gain by means of experience is a claim defended in the debate about the mind–body problem and consciousness (e.g., Nagel 1974; Jackson 1982), and in the debate on the so-called “knowledge argument” in particular.  Christiana Werner Simultaneously, the philosophy of imagination...
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When Do People Have an Obligation Not to Tic?

Today's post is by Joseph Masotti (University of California San Diego) and Paul Conway (University of Southampton) on their recent paper, " When Do People Have an Obligation Not to Tic? Blame, Free Will, and Moral Character Judgments of People with Tourette’s Syndrome " ( Neuroethics 2024). Joseph Masotti Imagine being in a public space when suddenly you feel an uncontrollable urge to shout a word or sound. You know others may judge you, and you want to resist, but the urge is overpowering. If you shout, you may explain to others that the urge was just too powerful to resist. But then, others may see you acting mechanistically, lacking the control needed to be responsible for your actions. On the other hand, you can’t take responsibility for your shouting, as you know it’s not intentional. This is the reality for many with Tourette’s Syndrome (TS), a neurological disorder characterized by involuntary tics.  Paul Conway Our study investigates how people perceive blame, f...
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Teaching philosophy of science to non-philosophers

In this post, Rani Lill Anjum and Elena Rocca introduce their new book, Philosophy of Science (Palgrave 2024). Philosophy of Science What do practitioners, researchers, and students have in common? They are all expected to accept a number of philosophical assumptions that are rarely discussed, although they profoundly shape a discipline. Most of these will be introduced via their education and are likely to remain unnoticed as long as one stays comfortably within the disciplinary boundaries of like-minded experts. Awareness of underlying tensions will typically emerge when expert from different disciplines try to arrive at a common ground. They might then have to choose what is the most reliable evidence among a range of contradicting observations. Should one trust population data, when they contradict an established theory? Should the success of an intervention be measured at population level or at the level of individuals? How should results obtained with lab models be used to make ...
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“I’m Not Hungry:” Bodily Representations and Bodily Experiences in Anorexia Nervosa

Today's post is by Mara Floris on her recent paper " “I’m Not Hungry:” Bodily Representations and Bodily Experiences in Anorexia Nervosa " ( Review of Philosophy and Psychology , 2024). Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is a severe psychiatric disorder characterized by an intense fear of gaining weight, leading to extreme food restriction and a distorted perception of one’s own body. In our paper, we explore how individuals with AN experience significant alterations in two primary domains: bodily representations and bodily experiences. Mara Floris Bodily Representations and Perceptual Distortions Bodily representations refer to the cognitive and perceptual processes that help us perceive and understand our body’s size, shape, and function. In individuals with AN, these representations are often distorted, leading to body image disturbances. These disturbances manifest as an overestimation of body size—patients with AN often perceive themselves as larger than they are. This mispercept...
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Affording Imagination

Today's post is by Tom McClelland and Monika Dunin-Kozicka on their recent paper, " Affording Imagination " ( Philosophical Psychology , 2024). Tom McClelland Our perception of our environment includes possibilities for action known as ‘affordances’. You might, for instance, perceive a ladder as affording climbing, an apple as affording eating or a teapot as affording pouring. In these examples the actions afforded are actions you do with your body, but affordance perception might also encompass opportunities to do things with your mind. In particular, you might perceive affordances to imagine . Do you perceive a wrapped present as affording imagining what’s inside? Does an obstacle course afford imagining how to traverse it? Does a precariously placed object afford imagining what would happen if it fell? Our paper answers ‘yes’ to these questions. Monika Dunin-Kozicka To make our case, we start by clarifying the very concept of imaginative affordances. With ordinary af...
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On Phenomenological Psychopathology

In this post, Susi Ferrarello , Francesca Brencio , Valeria Bizzari and Magnus Englander present a recent special issue of Frontiers in Psychology entitled: " Phenomenological Psychopathology: Who, What and How? An analysis of key figures, advancements and challenges ”.  Valeria Bizzari Phenomenology offers psychopathology a framework for understanding the patient’s lived experience without preconceptions, while psychopathology allows phenomenology to explore human plurality more deeply. In this special issue we aimed to gather papers focusing on the intersection of phenomenology and psychopathology, examining key concepts, contemporary challenges, and clinical applications.  Topics of interest include: the theoretical and practical advancements of phenomenological psychopathology the role of embodiment emotions like envy and melancholy in disorders  the use of phenomenological methodologies like interviews in clinical settings.  Key phenomenological concepts such ...
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