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Fantastic Philosophy

 This post is by Sally Latham.


Fantastic Philosophy


Teaching philosophy to children has been shown to have a positive impact not only on critical thinking and creativity, but also on emotional development, such as independence, self-assurance and self-assertion (Rahar et al 2018). 

Yet philosophy is not explicitly part of the National Curriculum for England, with the closest reference being that in English: "Pupils] must be assisted in making their thinking clear to themselves as well as to others and teachers should ensure that pupils build secure foundations by using discussion to probe and remedy their misconceptions. Pupils should also be taught to understand and use the conventions for discussion and debate."

However, teachers are not always confident in bringing critical thinking into the classroom without formal training. 

Labour have also now identified ‘improving communication skills (oracy)’ as one of their  targets in their mission statement Breaking Down the Barriers to Opportunity: "A significant barrier to young people getting on in life is an inability to speak up, to express their views, to ask for help, to persuade others, to collaborate successfully. These vital speaking skills are becoming even more important in the workplace and yet are not always taught in schools."

With all of this in mind, Fantastic Philosophy was born. This is a new show on BBC Teach, narrated by Sir Stephen Fry, patron of SAPERE (soon to be Thoughtful), the UK’s national charity for Philosophy for Children (P4C).   

The ethos behind the show is to help teachers and parents to make philosophy, critical thinking and oracy accessible to all children, no matter what their socio-economic or educational background. Entertaining and irreverent, each 11-minute video tackles a philosophical debate, complete with questions to encourage classroom discussion, allowing children to push boundaries in their thinking.

In a world of fake news and misinformation, teaching children to think critically is more important than ever. Developing oracy has to be something accessible to all children, or there will be some voices, both children’s and adults’, that remain unheard. 

Set in the savanna where the animals have lives pretty much like ours, King Lawrence the Lion makes decrees about how everyone should behave, watched by his long-suffering advisor Maple the Meerkat, as things usually end up going pretty wrong. 


Episode 1 of Fantastic Philosophy

In Episode One: Is it ever right to lie? King Lawrence thinks it’s simple… no one should ever lie. But when telling the truth has some disastrous consequences for the animals in the savanna, he thinks again. He makes a new decree that the animals can lie if it produces good consequences, but this leads to chaos. 


Episode 2 of Fantastic Philosophy

In Episode Two: Should everybody be allowed to say what they like? King Laurence thinks we should never offend anyone. But when the other animals find out that they can’t say very much at all, King Lawrence changes his mind and rules that everyone can say what they like. But this does not end well.


Episode 3 of Fantastic Philosophy


In Episode Three: Do adults always know best? King Laurence rules that we should always do what adults say. Of course we need to do what our trusted adults tell us to, but the animals in the savanna find out that sometimes kids know more than adults (especially when it comes to fashion). However knowing when kids can teach adults things can be tricky. 

Fantastic Philosophy is produced by Allan Johnston of Jungle Studios, written by Will Johnston and illustrated by Luella Jane Wright

Fantastic Philosophy aims to help every child find their voice. 


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