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Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering

Today's post is by Annalisa Coliva on her new paper Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering (Social Epistemology, 2024).



Annalisa Coliva


In this paper, I dive into what Miranda Fricker calls "hermeneutical injustice" in her work Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007), exploring how it plays out in the medical field. Using the long and problematic history of hysteria as a case study, I argue that this concept was misused as a diagnostic tool for centuries, until it was dropped in 1980 with the DSM-III. The reason for this lies in deep-rooted power structures shaped by prejudice against women.

I propose that hysteria perfectly fits Fricker's idea of hermeneutical injustice, but it also reveals the need to broaden the concept itself. This approach is crucial for two key reasons. First, rather than treating the medical field as a passive arena for testing philosophical ideas, I show how medical history can actively refine our philosophical understanding. Specifically, I suggest that hermeneutical injustice doesn’t just arise from gaps in our interpretive resources, but also from the existence of flawed concepts—like hysteria —that distort understanding.

Second, once we expand the concept of hermeneutical injustice, it becomes a powerful tool to challenge other biased notions that still carry identity-based prejudice. This can help move beyond the "essentialist" traps common in debates about concepts like woman—where ideas about women are often anchored in rigid views of biological or social nature. By applying the refined concept of hermeneutical injustice, we can sidestep these limiting debates and create space for more inclusive interpretations, such as those that help transwomen make sense of their experiences while reducing prejudice.

The redefined concept of hermeneutical injustice doesn't just apply to gender. It can also shine a light on the epistemic harm done by slurs, insults, and derogatory terms, which similarly perpetuate identity-based prejudice. Hysteria, in particular, stands out as a harmful concept steeped in sexism. Its use diminishes women’s ability to fully understand and articulate their experiences, reinforcing epistemic injustices like testimonial injustice and what I call "rationality injustice"—the systemic devaluing of women’s reasoning abilities due to bias.

For this reason, I argue that terms like “hysterical” should no longer be used descriptively. However, there is also potential for women to reclaim hysteria, much like other derogatory terms have been reappropriated by marginalized groups, turning harmful concepts into sources of empowerment and solidarity.
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