Skip to main content

The Buddhist Theory of No-self and the Mechanisms of Mindfulness

This week's blogpost is from Browyn Finnigan, associate professor at Australian National University, on her recent publication Self-related processing removal or revision? The Buddhist theory of no-self and the mechanisms of mindfulness in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 


Browyn Finnigan


There is strong evidence that mindfulness helps reduce stress, anxiety, and depression. But scientists are less certain about the mechanisms behind these effects. Inspired by the Buddhist idea of anattā, or no-self, some suggest that mindfulness works by attenuating or reducing all senses of self. Proponents argue that mindfulness fosters disidentification from one’s experience and reduces rumination, which plays a significant role in anxiety and depression. They infer that the benefits of mindfulness arise from decreasing rumination through a reduction in all kinds of ‘self-related processing’ (SRP).

Drawing on the research of Britton and Lindahl, I argue that there is little empirical evidence to support this broad proposal, and even some evidence to suggest that removing all SRP might have detrimental effects. SRP includes not just self-involved thinking, but also a minimal sense of being a subject of conscious experience and agent of one’s actions and decisions. 

While evidence indicates that mindfulness reduces negative self-involved thinking, this does not imply a reduced sense of subjectivity. Some studies also suggest that the benefits of reduced rumination may arise not from a decrease in self-involved thinking, in general, but rather from a decrease in negative self-involved thoughts or a shift from negative to more positive self-concepts. These findings might seem to count against the Buddhist no-self view.

I argue, however, that the Buddhist doctrine of no-self need not be understood to recommend erasing all senses of self when operationalized as a mental health strategy. Alternative interpretations of this teaching allow for the conventional use of self-conceptions as skillful tools to reduce suffering and enhance well-being. For the same reasons, such interpretations can support revising one’s self-conception, from negative to more realistically positive. I further suggest that this perspective can be integrated within cognitive-based forms of mindfulness practice.

Changing negative self-conceptions is notoriously difficult, in part because they often reinforce themselves. Believing that one cannot perform well in some domain, such as public speaking, can undermine effort in that area, leading to poor results that seem to confirm the original belief. I propose that the Buddha’s teaching of no-self might support revision in negative self-beliefs in at least two ways. 

First, the Buddha’s claim that we lack a fixed, unchanging self but are instead a highly complex causal series of impermanent psychological and physical states may help loosen our attachment to rigid self-conceptions. 

Second, the way we think about ourselves has a causal impact on our actions. Since there is strong evidence that positive self-conceptions contribute to better health outcomes, we have good reason to cultivate more positive views of our abilities, even if our immediate experience does not yet fully reflect them.

While the science remains unsettled on whether eliminating all senses of self yields mental health benefits, I show that the Buddhist teaching of no-self need not be operationalized in this way. Alternative interpretations are available that align more closely with existing findings. Overall, there are many more possibilities available for developing a Buddhist-inspired account of mechanisms of mindfulness.

Popular posts from this blog

Delusions in the DSM 5

This post is by Lisa Bortolotti. How has the definition of delusions changed in the DSM 5? Here are some first impressions. In the DSM-IV (Glossary) delusions were defined as follows: Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.

Rationalization: Why your intelligence, vigilance and expertise probably don't protect you

Today's post is by Jonathan Ellis , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Public Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Eric Schwitzgebel , Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. This is the first in a two-part contribution on their paper "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical thought" in Moral Inferences , eds. J. F. Bonnefon and B. Trémolière (Psychology Press, 2017). We’ve all been there. You’re arguing with someone – about politics, or a policy at work, or about whose turn it is to do the dishes – and they keep finding all kinds of self-serving justifications for their view. When one of their arguments is defeated, rather than rethinking their position they just leap to another argument, then maybe another. They’re rationalizing –coming up with convenient defenses for what they want to believe, rather than responding even-handedly to the points you're making. Yo...

A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind

Today's post is by  Karen Yan (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) on her recent paper (co-authored with Chuan-Ya Liao), " A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind " ( Synthese 2023). Karen Yan What drives us to write this paper is our curiosity about what it means when philosophers of mind claim their works are informed by empirical evidence and how to assess this quality of empirically-informedness. Building on Knobe’s (2015) quantitative metaphilosophical analyses of empirically-informed philosophy of mind (EIPM), we investigated further how empirically-informed philosophers rely on empirical research and what metaphilosophical lessons to draw from our empirical results.  We utilize scientometric tools and categorization analysis to provide an empirically reliable description of EIPM. Our methodological novelty lies in integrating the co-citation analysis tool with the conceptual resources from the philosoph...