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Bridging Academic Philosophy and Psychotherapy

In this follow-up to last week's post, Sorin Baiasu (University of Liverpool) and Luke Jordan (NHS Compass Manchester) continue introducing their interdisciplinary project on philosophy and mental well-being.

Luke Jordan

We currently face a particularly serious problem: a global mental health crisis combined with the psychiatrisation of society and medicalisation of mental disorders. To contribute to a solution to this serious challenge, our interdisciplinary research relies on some of academic philosophy’s untapped resources. In particular, we examine philosophy’s training potential for the mental health workforce through continuing professional development (CPD) sessions.

Providing training to mental health practitioners through philosophy may lead to a common problem: misaligned and irrelevant content. On one good account of the differences between psychotherapy and academic philosophy, the latter is a self-reflective discipline, usually classed among the ‘humanities’. These are ‘timeless’ subjects appealing to all mature people in general; by contrast, mental health practitioners encounter philosophical problems of specific individuals, in particular and concrete contexts. Similarly, although philosophical counselling uses the same tools as academic philosophy, unlike philosophy, it focuses on helping concrete individuals to deal with specific life-problems.

Consider also that teaching in academic contexts is usually organised around the assessments the student will have to complete, in order to finish a module and a course; by contrast, the aims of a CPD session are structured by the more practical needs of the trainees.

Training content should be aligned to the needs of the audience. To achieve this, we draw on our previous experience and research (particularly an analogy with mediation in critical ethics), specifically on philosophical counselling as mediator between philosophy and psychotherapy, between the philosopher delivering the session and the practitioners who receive the training.

In particular, we have set as a requirement that the researcher leading the session study certain relevant texts from the philosophical counselling literature, texts which include also case studies. CPD sessions are designed to introduce philosophical topics academically, but the case studies from the philosophical counselling literature contextualise such topics by reference to specific individuals and their life-problems.

In February 2026, we delivered successfully to nurses, psychologists and social workers in the NHS, a CPD session designed according to this model. Given the impact of this pilot session, we entered into discussion with members of Greater Manchester Mental Health Trust and Pennine Care Mental Health Trust. Leaders in these settings have expressed interest in further CPD sessions designed according to our innovative model. Trainees (25-30 participants) will include nurses, social workers, and psychologists from the NHS England.

CPD in mental health care has been said to include aims such as building effectiveness, encouraging novel ways of thinking, learning from disciplines from beyond medicine, forming global perspectives and supporting the well-being of staff. Our innovative use of case studies in philosophical counselling to intermediate between academic philosophy and psychotherapy will structure the next CPD sessions, devised to further explore how philosophy can be used with individuals who access the NHS for support with their mental health and well-being-related issues. Upon further confirmation of our innovative methodology, through ongoing use of co-design principles, we will continue to examine this and additional avenues for the use of philosophy in the NHS.

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