Tom McClelland spoke first on the Grand Illusion Hypothesis (GIH). According to the GIH, we overestimate how rich visual experience is outside of focal attention. McClelland described empirical findings showing that our visual systems compensate for the limits of attention by encoding information about the average features of groups or crowds. McClelland outlined precisely how findings relating to this ‘ensemble perception’ should be viewed as important to the GIH. He denied that the findings show that there is no Grand Illusion, but argued that they do suggest that visual phenomenology is less diminished than the GIH might seem to suggest because our experience of things outside focal attention can be aided by ‘ensemble perception’.
Tony Cheng argued that experiences that are about mind-independent objects imply an understanding of ourselves as physical objects in a world independent of language and self-knowledge. He claimed that all experiences that are about mind-independent objects require allocentric spatial representation, that is, representation that encodes information about the location of one object with respect to other objects. Then he argued that representation of this sort requires that we represent ourselves as situated in a mind-independent world.
Casey Doyle started with the premise that although it is possible to know of your intentional attitudes by testimony there seem to be reasons against doing so. He argued that an account of first-person authority ought to be able to explain this but the standard view, according to which we have epistemic privilege over our thoughts, cannot. He also claimed that there is no inherent weakness in testimony that explains why we should not depend upon it. Doyle proposed an agential model of first-person authority as an alternative explanation of first person authority.