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The Mental Life of Others

In this post, Constantine Sandis, Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire and Director of Lex Academic, presents his new book on Wittgenstein for Anthem Press, Wittgenstein on Other Minds.


Book cover

 

‘Even if someone were to express everything that is “within him”, we wouldn’t necessarily understand him’ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, § 191.

The so-called ‘problem of other minds’ is typically understood as a problem in epistemology regarding whether we can ever really be sure of what anybody else is thinking or feeling. At its solipsistic extreme, philosophers have wondered whether we can ever know that other people exist at all. How can I be certain that those around me are not all automata or mere figments of my imagination?

In his later work, Ludwig Wittgenstein was at pains to dismiss such worries, not because we can prove that sceptics are wrong, but because their objections can be shown to be nonsensical. General phrases such as ‘other beings have minds’ are neither true nor false but, rather, rules of grammar or that enable us to make particular truth-apt statements, such as ‘Patti is bored’ or ‘Bruce wants to play a game’.

None of this is to deny, however, that there are no real-life obstacles to understanding others or, indeed, ourselves. Paradoxically, Wittgenstein’s personal scepticism regarding the possibility of understanding even his closest friends (and being understood by them) was as radical as his philosophical anti-scepticism. This was not due to any a priori argument purporting to prove that the impossibility of knowing what anybody thinks. 

Rather, Wittgenstein’s difficulty was an everyday psychological and cultural one. Referring to this as ‘the real problem of others’, Professor Marie McGinn has insightfully pointed out that ‘Wittgenstein is deeply opposed to the idea that our everyday doubts about others amount to a way of “living scepticism”’. We proceed with our daily lives free of this disease. But this does not preclude the behaviour of others striking us an enigmatic.

I have been working on this real problem of understanding others, and Wittgenstein’s approach to it, for over a decade. My new book for Anthem Press, Wittgenstein on Other Minds: Strangers in a Strange Land, collects revised versions of nine essays I have written on these themes, bookended by a specially written introduction and a conversation piece with Richard Harper. The aim of the book is to show how Wittgenstein’s philosophical anti-scepticism is fully compatible with his real-life sceptical worries concerning our imperfect knowledge of the mental lives of others, both human and non-human alike.

Each individual chapter focuses on particular areas such as philosophical psychology, cultural anthropology, the philosophy of history, translation, non-human concepts, and the explanation of explanation. Collectively, however, they paint a picture of everyday challenges of understanding others and what, if any, expectations we may reasonably have for overcoming them. 

Proceeding via an exegesis of Wittgenstein’s public and private writings on these matters, the book aims to showcase the relevance of the Austrian philosopher’s thought beyond the academy, touching on topics as wide-ranging as those of friendship, human–animal relationships, psychological doubt, intercultural understanding, aesthetic experience, historiography, human-computer interaction, the nature of practices, and forms of life. I hope you like it!

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