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Epistemic Injustice and the Language of Modern Dating

This post is by Lina Lissia. Lina's research focuses on formal epistemology, philosophy of action, clinical psychology, and psychoanalysis. She is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Cagliari within the PRIN PNRR project Metaphor and Epistemic Injustice in Mental Illness: The Case of Schizophrenia. In addition to her academic work, she practices as a psychoanalyst in Paris.


Lina Lissia


Miranda Fricker introduced the concept of hermeneutical injustice, a type of epistemic injustice in which individuals or groups lack the conceptual tools to articulate their experiences. This absence of language prevents recognition and understanding, leaving certain realities invisible. In recent years, this phenomenon has become especially evident in the world of dating, where a surge of neologisms—ghosting, breadcrumbing, orbiting, zombieing, and many more—has emerged as an attempt to give shape to experiences that were previously unrecognized.

The rising of dating neologisms

Modern dating is shaped by shifting cultural norms and the omnipresence of social media, fostering the emergence of new terms that describe ambiguous or harmful relationship dynamics. Ghosting famously refers to the sudden and unexplained disappearance of a romantic interest, leaving the other person without closure. Breadcrumbing describes sporadic engagement—just enough attention to keep someone interested without committing. Orbiting occurs when someone stays present in an ex’s digital sphere, engaging with their social media but avoiding direct contact. Zombieing refers to a person who reappears after ghosting, as if resurrected from the dead. Similarly, the term situationship has emerged to describe a romantic connection that lacks clear commitment or definition.

Naming the Invisible: A Response to Hermeneutical Injustice

These terms are not mere slang or internet trends; they function as linguistic tools that allow individuals to identify and articulate relational distress. Naming such behaviors provides a sense of empowerment, helping people validate their emotions and recognize shared experiences. Without a framework for describing these dynamics, many would struggle to process and communicate their discomfort, frustration, or trauma. This aligns with Fricker’s argument: language grants visibility, and without it, suffering remains misunderstood and unaddressed.

The internet and social media have undeniably accelerated the dissemination of these terms. Compared to past decades, online discussions contribute to shaping collective understanding. However, this linguistic creativity should be viewed not just as cultural expression but as a symptom of relational distress. The widespread engagement with psychological concepts—such as narcissism or attachment styles—underscores a growing desire to understand emotional wounds and interpersonal struggles.


Dating


The Double-Edged Sword of Therapy Speak

While the expansion of relational vocabulary can be valuable, it is not without risks. The rise in therapy speak—language derived from psychological concepts—can lead to misapplication. Some people use these terms to assign blame (“You’re gaslighting me!”), while others use them to justify their own behaviors (“I ghosted you because I have avoidant attachment”). Additionally, therapy speak has the potential to obscure more than it clarifies—relying on clichés and overly simplified labels that hinder authentic emotional expression. Despite these complexities, the need to label relational difficulties ultimately stems from a genuine effort to understand personal experiences.

Philosophical and Clinical Implications

Given this landscape, it is crucial for philosophers to engage with the ethics of relationships. Understanding how interpersonal dynamics shape emotional health requires careful ethical reflection—not just on individual behaviors, but also on the societal norms that influence them. The collaboration between philosophy and clinical psychology can help individuals develop meaningful ways to articulate their experiences, while also fostering accountability and ethical responsibility in relationships. Language does not merely describe reality—it shapes it. By recognizing and naming relational harm, individuals can better navigate the moral dimensions of their interactions.

In the face of relational ambiguity, this evolving vocabulary, if used correctly and well understood, serves as a tool for ethical discernment, helping people move beyond passive frustration toward conscious, intentional engagement with others. Examining the ethics of relationships is not just an intellectual exercise but an important step toward fostering deeper, more authentic connections.

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