The ‘Phenomenological Congruence and Flexibility’ approach to disability

This week's post is by Joshua Sealy (Macquarie University) on his recent paper Redefining disability and pathology as both developmental and relational: the ‘phenomenological congruence and flexibility’ approach to disability in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 

Joshua Sealy

A popular sentiment in the deaf community is that deafness is not a disability, it is a ‘difference’, with deaf cultures all over the world acting as sources of various values and habits associated with sight, touch, sign language, and solidarity. On the other hand, deafness is hearing impairment, a dysfunction of the deaf person’s ear and/or brain; a disability. Many assume an irreconcilable tension between the two positions. But growing up as a deaf person, I knew intuitively that both positions were true at the same time.

The solution required addressing messy definitions of ability, disability, impairment, and pathology. Indeed, a deaf person can be ‘healthy’ despite their disability while an ‘able-bodied’ person has ‘pathological embodiment’. Two questions arise from this tension: Does it matter if a deaf person is considered disabled? And why should it matter if pathology is a dimension that applies to every person regardless of their bodymind? Recent e-cognition and phenomenological approaches have made strides in distinguishing disability from pathology. 

However, these approaches do not quite cover the full scope of the disability-pathology dynamic. Blurred definitions persist, like naming a ‘disability’ and its ‘consequences’ as ‘disability’, with ‘pathology’ eager to squeeze itself in there somewhere arbitrarily. Additionally, oppression isn't the only explanation for the issues disabled people face; we must also account for under-skilled intentionality. Language deprivation—which causes permanent developmental deficits like executive function issues—is unfortunately common among deaf people. This often stems from risky early intervention decisions like enforced oralism and cochlear implants—these devices are not a 100% effective cure; I have one myself.

To fully understand this dynamic, a developmental-relational perspective must be embraced. We must recognise the importance of relational quality over time. Fundamentally, we learn most skills through modelling. Effective teaching and learning occur when the teacher-student coupling is both sufficient (they understand each other) and reliable (the understanding is sustained over time). If this process is disrupted or unsupported, learning collapses. Many developmental psychology theories point to this process implicitly (e.g. Zone of Proximal Development, Scaffolding Theory).

At the heart of this successful process is what I call phenomenological congruence. This is, in essence, sufficient and reliable coupling, experienced by agents as a sufficient experiential intelligibility of the world. The situation between agent and ecology is arranged so that agents experience their surroundings as navigable, readable, and accessible, offering practical coherence that allows for meaningful engagement.

This congruence relies on two overlapping factors:

1. the conditions of the specific space that enable or impede congruence

2. the agent’s own phenomenological flexibility, i.e., their ability to negotiate with and navigate various ecologies across time.

Learning to recognise congruence and develop flexibility is fundamentally relational-developmental. Disabled people follow this process too, learning skills specific to their bodymind and their ecologies. For instance, teaching blind people to navigate like sighted people is ridiculous; you want them to navigate as blind people! Deaf culture plays exactly this role, a source of relevant skills for deaf people to acquire and embody so that they can experience phenomenological congruence. 

Pathology emerges when these two factors break down, stemming from lack of opportunities (inflexible agents/ecological features propagating phenomenological incongruence) or lack of abilities (inflexibility within the agent/s). We need opportunities to develop abilities, which in turn creates more opportunities; lacking one inevitably deprives the other. 

This framework answers my initial questions: Yes, the disability label is necessary. Here, “disability” functions as a vital marker within the relational-developmental process, signalling an urgent need for specific conditions, especially in sensitive developmental contexts. Disability prompts a specific kind of attention, demanding additional care, opportunities, and relational flexibility. If this marker is ignored—and the disabled person lacks opportunities to develop relevant abilities—the risk of pathological embodiment drastically increases. 

By shifting our focus to phenomenological congruence, we move past the rigid difference-versus-disability, medical-versus-social debate. Consequently, we should strive to find what works for every individual. We come in many shapes and sizes, with various abilities and disabilities, where the “goodness of fit” fluctuates across the lifespan. It then makes sense to consider forms of life in terms of flexible optimality, allowing space to discover and improvise unorthodox demeanours from which everyone can learn, benefit, and share.