Skip to main content

Philosophy and Psychoanalysis in Dialogue

This week we feature a report on a conference on the dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis. The author, Marthe Kerkwijk, is a graduate student at Heythrop College, University of London.

Senate House, London
On Friday 17th and Saturday 18th of October, Heythrop College, London, the Institute of Philosophy and the Institute of Psychoanalysis co-organised a conference on the dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis. Philosophers' critical evaluations of the methodologies of psychoanalysis are well known, but in the last few decades philosophy and psychoanalysis have mutually influenced each other in more constructive ways. The conference brought together prominent scholars whose work navigates the intersection between philosophy and psychoanalysis in order to reinforce fruitful dialogue between both disciplines. Jonathan Lear, professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago and psychoanalyst, delivered the keynote address. The conference took place in the Chancellors Hall in Senate House and attracted more than 120 delegates.

Jonathan Lear's keynote address on Friday evening was titled 'The fundamental rule'. Lear proposed the thesis that the significance of psychoanalysis to philosophy is best thought of as a practical and ethical engagement rather than in terms of any of its theoretical claims. This idea hinges on what Freud called 'the fundamental rule': the task to speak one's mind without inhibitions. This is a very difficult rule to follow, but the unfolding of self-consciousness is recognised since the Socratic tradition as an activity that marks us as human. Psychoanalysis is not only helpful in our understanding of the human mind, but the psychoanalytic process shows us how it could be that truth cures.

The remaining presentations were organised in panels, each about a domain in which philosophy and psychoanalysis meet.

Panel A: Psychoanalysis: the empirical evidence base discussed the scientific status of psychoanalysis and empirical evidence base of psychoanalysis, with papers by Morris Eagle (psychoanalyst, NYU), James Hopkins (philosopher, King's College, London and UCL) and Mary Target (psychoanalyst, UCL), chaired by Michael Lacewing (philosopher, Heythrop College, London).

Panel B: Psychoanalysis, philosophy and religion discussed how psychoanalysis and philosophy respectively might relate to religion, with papers by David Black (psychoanalyst, British Psychoanalytical Society), Beverley Clack (philosopher, Oxford Brookes) and John Cottingham (philosopher, Heythrop and Reading), chaired by Denis Flynn (psychoanalyst, British Psychoanalytical Society).

Panel C: Ethics discussed the virtues and values underlying psychoanalytic practices, with papers by Michael Lacewing, Margaret Rustin (psychoanalyst, British Psychoanalytical Society and Tavistock) and Bennett Simon (psychoanalyst, Harvard and Boston Psychoanalytic Society), chaired by Edward Harcourt (philosopher, Oxford).

Katalin Farkas and the other panelists in Panel D
Panel D: Mind and self-knowledge discussed the significance and limitations of knowing our own mind and that of others for philosophy, with papers by Katalin Farkas (philosopher, Central European University), Adam Leite (philosopher, Indiana) and Edna O'Shaughnessy (psychoanalyst, British Psychoanalytical Society and Tavistock), chaired by David Bell (psychoanalyst, British Psychoanalytical Society and Tavistock).

Panel E: Art and Aesthetics discussed how art might relate to the minds of the artist and audience, with papers by Jenefer Robinson (philosopher, Cincinnati), Francis Grier (psychoanalyst and composer, British Psychoanalytical Society) and Jeremy Lewison (freelance curator, British Psychoanalytical Society), chaired by John Lawrence (psychoanalyst, British Psychoanalytical Society.

The conference closed with a lively plenary discussion in which the topics of all panels were discussed and brought together.

Popular posts from this blog

Delusions in the DSM 5

This post is by Lisa Bortolotti. How has the definition of delusions changed in the DSM 5? Here are some first impressions. In the DSM-IV (Glossary) delusions were defined as follows: Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.

Rationalization: Why your intelligence, vigilance and expertise probably don't protect you

Today's post is by Jonathan Ellis , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Public Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Eric Schwitzgebel , Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. This is the first in a two-part contribution on their paper "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical thought" in Moral Inferences , eds. J. F. Bonnefon and B. Trémolière (Psychology Press, 2017). We’ve all been there. You’re arguing with someone – about politics, or a policy at work, or about whose turn it is to do the dishes – and they keep finding all kinds of self-serving justifications for their view. When one of their arguments is defeated, rather than rethinking their position they just leap to another argument, then maybe another. They’re rationalizing –coming up with convenient defenses for what they want to believe, rather than responding even-handedly to the points you're making. Yo

A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind

Today's post is by  Karen Yan (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) on her recent paper (co-authored with Chuan-Ya Liao), " A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind " ( Synthese 2023). Karen Yan What drives us to write this paper is our curiosity about what it means when philosophers of mind claim their works are informed by empirical evidence and how to assess this quality of empirically-informedness. Building on Knobe’s (2015) quantitative metaphilosophical analyses of empirically-informed philosophy of mind (EIPM), we investigated further how empirically-informed philosophers rely on empirical research and what metaphilosophical lessons to draw from our empirical results.  We utilize scientometric tools and categorization analysis to provide an empirically reliable description of EIPM. Our methodological novelty lies in integrating the co-citation analysis tool with the conceptual resources from the philosoph