Skip to main content

Only Imagine. Fiction, Interpretation and Imagination

Kathleen Stock is a Philosopher at the University of Sussex, working on questions about imagination and fiction, including: What is the imagination? What is the relation between imagining and believing? What is fiction? Can we learn from fiction? Are there limits to what we can imagine? She has published widely on related topics, and her book Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation and Imagination is now out with Oxford University Press. She blogs about fiction and imagination at thinkingaboutfiction.me.





Philosophers and literary theorists argue about three things: what fiction is, how fiction should be interpreted, and what imagination is. In Only Imagine, I suggest that all three questions can be illuminated simultaneously.  I aim to build a theory of fiction that also tells us about the imagination, and vice versa.

My focus is on texts. First, I defend a theory of fictional interpretation (or ‘fictional truth’ as it’s sometimes called). When we read a novel or story, we understand certain things as part of the plot: ‘truths’ about characters, places, and events (though of course these are usually not actually true, but made up). A lot of the time, these ‘truths’ are made explicit – directly referred to by the words used by the author. But equally, in many cases, plot elements are only implied, not referred to explicitly. By what principle does or should the reader work out what such elements are, for a given story? Whether explicit or implied, I argue that fictional truths are to be discerned by working out what the author of the story intended the reader to imagine.

Next, I build on this point in several ways. For one, I show how this intentionalist theory complements a plausible story about how we can learn important truths from fictions; and also why we ‘resist’ imaginatively engaging with certain fictional passages. But equally, I argue that my theory lends itself to a very simple and attractive story about what a fiction is: a fiction is (again roughly, but accurately enough for our purposes) a set of instructions to imagine certain things as the case.

This, finally, leads us back to the imagination. I assume that in reading a fiction, a reader uses her imagination to engage with both explicit and implied plot elements. So looking at the way readers engage with fictions gives us a great source of information about how the imagination can work. Philosophers often discuss imagination, but a lot of their pronouncements look ad hoc; not so if we focus on the reader’s imagination.




Now we know how fictional truths are to be interpreted, and what a fiction is, we can see that certain popular ideas about the imagination are wrong. One such idea is that imagination is ‘by default’ belief-like, in the sense that imaginative episodes tend to be constrained in their formation and development, as beliefs with the same contents would be.  Another idea, equally wrongheaded in my view, is that the imagination is always completely unconstrained, to the point where imagination could never be a good guide to what might plausibly happen in the world, let alone what is possible in it.

Both of these views ignore the facts that one’s imagination, in reading fiction, is primarily directed towards what an author intends readers to imagine; that authors can have diverse intentions, in writing fiction; and that the mechanisms by which authors signal their intentions are diverse too. It’s true that sometimes, for some fictions, the reader’s imagination is constrained in a ‘belief-like’ way, but only where the author sanctions it because she makes it clear she intends to explore some counterfactual (i.e. way the actual world could or would have been). However, equally, there are many cases, in genre fiction and elsewhere, where this isn’t sanctioned; even actively discouraged.

So really, it is unhelpful to say that imagination is by default belief-like, or always unconstrained: it depends on the purposes to which imagination is being put. Some imaginative episodes are in the services of working out counterfactuals, and are appropriately constrained by prior relevant beliefs; other imaginative episodes emphatically are not. We are left with the idea of imagining as a multi-functional tool, controlled by our purposes, with no particular function dominating as its ‘central’ one.

Popular posts from this blog

Delusions in the DSM 5

This post is by Lisa Bortolotti. How has the definition of delusions changed in the DSM 5? Here are some first impressions. In the DSM-IV (Glossary) delusions were defined as follows: Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.

Rationalization: Why your intelligence, vigilance and expertise probably don't protect you

Today's post is by Jonathan Ellis , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Public Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Eric Schwitzgebel , Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. This is the first in a two-part contribution on their paper "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical thought" in Moral Inferences , eds. J. F. Bonnefon and B. Trémolière (Psychology Press, 2017). We’ve all been there. You’re arguing with someone – about politics, or a policy at work, or about whose turn it is to do the dishes – and they keep finding all kinds of self-serving justifications for their view. When one of their arguments is defeated, rather than rethinking their position they just leap to another argument, then maybe another. They’re rationalizing –coming up with convenient defenses for what they want to believe, rather than responding even-handedly to the points you're making. Yo

A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind

Today's post is by  Karen Yan (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) on her recent paper (co-authored with Chuan-Ya Liao), " A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind " ( Synthese 2023). Karen Yan What drives us to write this paper is our curiosity about what it means when philosophers of mind claim their works are informed by empirical evidence and how to assess this quality of empirically-informedness. Building on Knobe’s (2015) quantitative metaphilosophical analyses of empirically-informed philosophy of mind (EIPM), we investigated further how empirically-informed philosophers rely on empirical research and what metaphilosophical lessons to draw from our empirical results.  We utilize scientometric tools and categorization analysis to provide an empirically reliable description of EIPM. Our methodological novelty lies in integrating the co-citation analysis tool with the conceptual resources from the philosoph