This post is by Jennifer Radden, Professor Emerita
of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Boston. Here, she discusses
some of the ideas in and related to her paper “Rethinking Disease in Psychiatry: Disease Models and the Medical Imaginary” recently published in the
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.
My philosophical research on the
understanding, care and implications of mental disorder reflects an abiding
interest in medical history. (Recent monographs with this focus include The Nature of Melancholy (2000), On Delusion (2011), and Melancholic Habits: Burton’s Anatomy for the Mind Sciences (2017).)
The era during which asylum-keepers were
gradually being replaced by newly professional and medically scientific
alienists, using observations from the asylum to consolidate ideas about a
class of distinctly mental diseases, offer us intriguing hints about how to
understand mental disorder today.
Salient for my paper about the medical
imaginary is the sheer range of separate, or at least apparently separable,
disorders represented in nineteenth century asylums and clinics: the brain
damaged and diseased alongside those diagnosed with “hysterical” (or, as they
later came to be known, “functional”) syndromes, including the ubiquitous
“melancholia,” the origin of whose symptoms would prove more elusive.
And with their similar symptom profiles, melancholy (or melancholia) and late-stage syphilis are drawn from that historical setting to support my claims about a comparison so apparently indisputable that it likely directed the emergence of (much of) today’s diagnostic psychiatry.
And with their similar symptom profiles, melancholy (or melancholia) and late-stage syphilis are drawn from that historical setting to support my claims about a comparison so apparently indisputable that it likely directed the emergence of (much of) today’s diagnostic psychiatry.
Why “imaginary”? Since writing that paper I
have discovered the phrase “imaginal mind” and wonder if a less misleading
title might have spoken of the medical imaginal, rather than imaginary, to
distance what I meant from any suggestion of imaginary in the sense of unreal
or untrue. But since I didn’t know about imaginality then, let me try and
explain my use of “imaginary.”
When we speak of analogies as “false,” we refer
to those that are not persuasive, are implausible, unconvincing or
un-compelling; analogies don’t possess actual truth value. Instead, they
involve assumptions, expectations, and other, often tacit, framings that direct
us to first see similarities, and then to embrace them (or not).
Our response is one that’s neither entirely emotional nor strictly reasoned - and sometimes, it’s prompted by sheer accidents of cultural history. With the analogies that guided how mental disorders came to be understood, I’m trying to illustrate, one of these extra considerations is a confluence of nineteenth century events that provided medical psychiatry with an almost irresistibly compelling way of seeing every and any mental disorder, serving to exclude all other possibilities.
Our response is one that’s neither entirely emotional nor strictly reasoned - and sometimes, it’s prompted by sheer accidents of cultural history. With the analogies that guided how mental disorders came to be understood, I’m trying to illustrate, one of these extra considerations is a confluence of nineteenth century events that provided medical psychiatry with an almost irresistibly compelling way of seeing every and any mental disorder, serving to exclude all other possibilities.
The imaginative/imaginal lock on this way
of seeing mental “diseases” contrasts with more relaxed depictions of
melancholy from earlier centuries, illustrated here using Burton’s summations
of past lore in the Anatomy of Melancholy.
And in our present day, it begins to loosen only recently, with developments such as network models, and the questioning of categorical approaches to disorder – each of which, I conjecture, has finally allowed us to glimpse mental diseases in ways more reminiscent of the ideas from much of the pre-nineteenth century era.
And in our present day, it begins to loosen only recently, with developments such as network models, and the questioning of categorical approaches to disorder – each of which, I conjecture, has finally allowed us to glimpse mental diseases in ways more reminiscent of the ideas from much of the pre-nineteenth century era.