On 17 June at the University of Birmingham, Kathleen Murphy-Hollies organised a workshop on conspiracy theories and storytelling with a stellar line-up. This post is a report of the event. The workshop is part of a project called "Film, Storytelling and Conspiracies" funded by a University of Birmingham Research Incubator Hub.
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| Conspiracy theories online |
First talk was by Catarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam) and was entitled "Conspiratorial Beliefs and Conspiracy Fantasies: Engaging with Wu Ming 1". The premise for the talk was that many think that conspiracy beliefs are on the rise and affect our political choices ("vibes-based politics"). One idea by Napolitano (2021) is that attempts to debunk conspiratorial beliefs with facts, evidence, and rational arguments do not work. Catarina aimed to respond to Napolitano.
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| Catarina Dutilh Novaes |
Wu Ming (in Mandarin, "No Name") is a collective originating in Bologna, a group of writers active in literature and popular culture rejecting the idea of celebrity and demistify the role of authorship. The novel Q emerged as part of the work of this collective and has a plot that is very similar to what the Qanon conspiracy theory claims to be true. Wu Ming defends the idea that the US conspiracy theorists responsible for spreading Qanon took inspiration from the novel.
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| The novel Q by Luther Blisset |
As conspiracies do exist, the key for Catarina is to distinguish between conspiratorial beliefs that should be investigated and which ones should be dismissed. So she moved to discuss "conspiracy fantasies" which is a subset of conspiratorial beliefs. They are universal ultra-conspiracies (all-encompassing, ahistorical, and atemporal) that are meant to explain everything. For these fantasies:
- Nothing happens by chance
- Nothing is as it seems
- Everything is connected.
What is interesting is that there are always kernels of truth in conspiracy fantasies: "conspiracy fantasies are a translation if a real discontent about a real problem" (Wu Ming 1). Also fantasies cause enchantment which people need and respond to anger, frustration, and the need for wonder and magic. The problem for Wu Ming 1 is that conspiracy fantasies help the system because they distract people from the real enemy, capitalism.
Catarina ended her talk with considerations about failure of debunking. According to Wu Ming 1, arguments do not address the needs of people who are attracted to conspiracy fantasies. And debunkers do not acknowledge the kernels of truth present in conspiracy fantasies, turning out to be "party poopers" who ruin the fun people are having when they engage with conspiracy fantasies.
Anna Ichino (University of Milan) was the second speaker in the workshop, asking how people can believe conspiracy theories. Anna started with a definition of conspiracy theories as epistemically problematic and proposed an imagination-view of conspiracy theories, where the attitude people take towards conspiracy theories is imagination rather belief. What are the reasons to defend the imagination view?
- Functional considerations (belief is constrained by evidence and leads to action; imagination is not constrained by evidence and does not necessarily lead to action).
- Linguistic considerations (people often ask questions about the themes of the conspiracy theory rather than state that the theory is true).
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| Cover of Mimesis as Make-Believe |
Anna started presenting the notion of make-believe developed by Kendall Walton in his book on Mimesis as Make-Believe. So there is a conspiracist make-believe game with basic rules and props. One important rule is "Imagine the contents of any theory that you encounter which contradicts an official theory". Another important rule is "When you encounter a piece of mainstream information, imagine a hidden plot for which that piece of information is a cover-up." Other rules and props can keep growing.
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| Anna Ichino |
Anna argued that conspiracy theories are not just the outcome of a game of make-believe, as they may be connected with mistrust against particular individuals and institutions, and other core negative beliefs which determine the specific content of conspiracy attitudes. The claim is that conspiracy theories share many features with fiction, including having a narrative structure and being playful and fun. That does not mean that the content of the conspiracy theories is not taken seriously: conspiracy theorists immerse themselves very deeply in the games they play and explore their implications.
What does the imagination-view imply for the problematic nature of conspiracy theories? The theories themselves are not epistemically irrational (as epistemic irrationality is reserved to beliefs) but there are doxastic attitudes conspiracy theorists have that are irrational (mistrust and core negative beliefs) and there are new beliefs people can adopt that are irrational and are attractive because they are consistent with the imagined plot.
After the lunch break, we had a talk by
Daniel Jolley (University of Nottingham) that was entitled: "From Noise to Narrative: How Minds Weave Conspiracy from Chaos". The starting point for the talk is that when there is a crisis what we need is meaning and so we create stories. Such stories sometimes are conspiracies: where people perceived as powerful are attributed evil intentions and are seen as a threat. In psychology, conspiracy beliefs are measured in self-report scales. Participants are asked to indicate their belief in specific events or general notions of conspiracy.
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| Daniel Jolley |
Conspiracy theories are motivated by a number of needs:
- an epistemic need to be informed and understand the world
- an existential need to be safe
- a social need to maintain valued interpersonal relationships.
Addressing these needs becomes more important during crises where people are scared and feel threatened. Economic hardship is a life circumstance that leads to the adoption of conspiracy theories. There is robust evidence that being in an unstable situation can make people believe that society is crumbling and is correlated to having conspiracy beliefs about what causes that unstable situation. Negative sentiments towards immigration make it more likely that people blame immigrants for their economic hardship.
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| Bullying |
Some crises are tied to group identity and some related to personal events such as illness and bereavement. Marginalised groups such as gay men can experience homophobia which generates a sense of social instability and hardship. Conspiracy beliefs can be a way to protect one's own victimised group from enemies. Discrimination is linked with higher levels of conspiracy theories. Bullying and trauma may not be related to group identity, but are cases of "personal chaos" or "personal crisis" and as such are also correlated with conspiracy theories. Anxiety and paranoia (that can be caused by phenomena such as bullying and trauma) lead to higher acceptance of conspiracy theories.
A sense that the world is unjust seems to be very important in making conspiracy theories attractive for people. The stories people create to make sense of an unjust world can increase violent behaviour; may be conducive to prejudice and discrimination; may be harmful to the targeted group.
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| Daniel Munro |
Next,
Daniel Munro (Boston University) presented a paper on conspiracy theories and storytelling, focusing on the skills underlying storytelling. The narratives in conspiracy theories offer emotional resolutions and are disseminated as distractions from ugly truths. Narratives according to Velleman (2003) end when there is an emotional resolution aroused by earlier events: e.g. in a romantic comedy we expect the central characters to get together. In the case of conspiracy theories, ugly truths arouse negative emotions and those negative emotions remain unresolved. So turning to stories for comfort is natural in the presence of ugly truths.
Finding narratives that have emotional resolutions involves creative skills that are used in crafting fiction but conspiracy theorists present their stories as narrative testimony. Narrative testimony is about testifying about actual events in a narrative form. Literary storytelling is long-form narrative fiction (novels, films, etc.) Both types of narrative have a typical arc of emotional arousal and resolution.
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| Creative skills |
Literary storytelling breaks free from how thing are in actuality but is constrained by engaging the emotions of the audience: imaginative scaffolding is necessary to draw reality-consistent details to make the story more emotionally realistic. Imaginative scaffolding also seems a useful activity to pursue to make conspiracy theories more convincing and build consensus around them ("know your audience!"). People who craft conspiracy theories exploit epistemic openness: the fact that their audiences do not assume that the story is fictional (whereas they would assume that it is fictional if they were reading a novel or watching a movie).
Last talk of the day was by
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini (University of North Carolina). Marianna argued that conspiracy theories are not believed but have an epistemic role because they preserve identity beliefs. Conspiracy theories are an instance of motivated reasoning through narratives. Aristotle says that the function of narratives and poetry is to relate what is possible, whereas the function of history is to relate what has happened. And knowledge of what might happen is more important for Aristotle as they reveal a deeper truth.
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| Marianna Ganapini |
Narration makes a judgement about believability: though fictional, the story could have been true because there is an element of similarity between the fictional story's world and the real world. Even if the facts narrated did not happen, the story "rings true" because the underlying principles (broader generalisations) apply not just to the fictional world but also to the actual world. The narrative becomes an argument for the broader generalisations.
Conspiracy theories are narratives:
- they are immune to counterevidence
- they are multiple stories with victims and perpetrators
- there are various (contradictory) versions of the same story
- there are fans of the narrative who contribute to it.
The conspiracy theory itself is not believed, but its core message is believed: even if it is not true in the actual world that Democrats are running a child-sex ring in the back of a pizzeria, the core message of the story (what makes the story believable) is true, that Democrats are evil and there is no limit to the bad things they can do. So conspiracy theories are narrative arguments for the believability of some principles that not only are compatible with the person's core beliefs, but can safeguard those core beliefs against counterevidence.
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Icarus story is fiction but its basic principle is believed
(overconfidence is harmful) |
The workshop was masterfully organised by Kathleen Murphy-Hollies who did an excellent job at bringing together philosophers and psychologists working on conspiracy theories and chairing the very interesting and stimulating discussion among participants.
