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PERFECT Launch (3): Depression and its Benefits

Magdalena Antrobus
My research focuses on epistemic and pragmatic benefits of imperfect cognitions found in the clinical population. More specifically I am interested in acquiring answers related to the question of the possible positive sides of mental disorders.

It is commonly known that mental illness constitutes a source of profound harm. It relates to individual suffering, distorts one’s cognitive, emotional and behavioural processes, and sometimes leads to severe impairment. However, the results of more recent psychological studies indicate that psychiatric disorders might be linked to particular benefits as well as causing pain.

There has been a well-researched relationship between bipolar disorder and creativity. It is believed that certain clinical symptoms brought by the illness, for example thought speed or openness for new experiences, may contribute to enhanced creativity (see for instance Ghaemi, 2011; Andreasen, 2005; Jamison, 1996). (For more details see my interview with Greg Currie.) If that were true, we would have the grounds to believe that bipolar disorder brings certain epistemic benefits. At the same time the illness may cause cognitive impairments in other areas of functioning, for example it may affect memory, sleep and concentration. The idea that pragmatic or psychological harm may coexist with the benefits of an epistemic kind is relatively new in psychiatry, thus researching it seems very exciting.

In the first year of the Project I am going to focus on another yet phenomenon related to the benefits of imperfect cognitions, that is, so-called “depressive realism” (DR). Studies on people suffering from depression indicate that they are able to make more accurate predictions about future events as well as describe the present reality in more accurate detail than healthy individuals. The ‘sadder but wiser’ phenomenon attracts a lot of attention from researchers. The following question comes to mind: what processes related to depression (if any) affect people in such a way that they are able to produce more balanced judgments? In order to address this question, a number of studies and experiments have been conducted (for instance, Yang et al. 2012; Jain et al. 2012; Seidel et al. 2012), with some of the reports confirming the DR thesis, whilst other presenting surprisingly contradictory outcomes.


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Another phenomenon closely related to DR is so called “defensive pessimism”. Recent studies indicate that pessimistic predictions over own future might carry important epistemic benefits. Such a way of perceiving the world, whether it is based on biased or realistic grounds or not, plays an important role in managing one’s anxiety. It has been evidenced that by setting one’s own expectations at a low level, people might avoid feeling extensively anxious or disappointed (you can read more about defensive pessimism here).

Providing accurate answers to the questions of possible upsides of mental disorders is also of great practical importance. A thorough understanding of the complexity of mental life could help battle social stigma and contribute to research on the most effective therapies.

Other areas of philosophy that I find exceptionally interesting and that PERFECT will allow me to explore further, are the relationship between body and mind (especially, embodied cognition and enactivism), and theories of happiness and of the value and meaning of life.

Here I talk about my plans for the first year of project PERFECT (video).

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