Imperfect Cognitions

In this post, Rani Lill Anjum and Elena Rocca introduce their new book, Philosophy of Science (Palgrave 2024). Philosophy of Science What do practitioners, researchers, and students have in common? They are all expected to accept a number of philosophical assumptions that are rarely discussed, although they profoundly shape a discipline. Most of these will be introduced via their education and are likely to remain unnoticed as long as one stays comfortably within the disciplinary boundaries of like-minded experts. Awareness of underlying tensions will typically emerge when expert from different disciplines try to arrive at a common ground. They might then have to choose what is the most reliable evidence among a range of contradicting observations. Should one trust population data, when they contradict an established theory? Should the success of an intervention be measured at population level or at the level of individuals? How should results obtained with lab models be used to make

Today's post is by Mara Floris on her recent paper " “I’m Not Hungry:” Bodily Representations and Bodily Experiences in Anorexia Nervosa " ( Review of Philosophy and Psychology , 2024). Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is a severe psychiatric disorder characterized by an intense fear of gaining weight, leading to extreme food restriction and a distorted perception of one’s own body. In our paper, we explore how individuals with AN experience significant alterations in two primary domains: bodily representations and bodily experiences. Mara Floris Bodily Representations and Perceptual Distortions Bodily representations refer to the cognitive and perceptual processes that help us perceive and understand our body’s size, shape, and function. In individuals with AN, these representations are often distorted, leading to body image disturbances. These disturbances manifest as an overestimation of body size—patients with AN often perceive themselves as larger than they are. This mispercept

Today's post is by Tom McClelland and Monika Dunin-Kozicka on their recent paper, " Affording Imagination " ( Philosophical Psychology , 2024). Tom McClelland Our perception of our environment includes possibilities for action known as ‘affordances’. You might, for instance, perceive a ladder as affording climbing, an apple as affording eating or a teapot as affording pouring. In these examples the actions afforded are actions you do with your body, but affordance perception might also encompass opportunities to do things with your mind. In particular, you might perceive affordances to imagine . Do you perceive a wrapped present as affording imagining what’s inside? Does an obstacle course afford imagining how to traverse it? Does a precariously placed object afford imagining what would happen if it fell? Our paper answers ‘yes’ to these questions. Monika Dunin-Kozicka To make our case, we start by clarifying the very concept of imaginative affordances. With ordinary af

In this post, Susi Ferrarello , Francesca Brencio , Valeria Bizzari and Magnus Englander present a recent special issue of Frontiers in Psychology entitled: " Phenomenological Psychopathology: Who, What and How? An analysis of key figures, advancements and challenges ”.  Valeria Bizzari Phenomenology offers psychopathology a framework for understanding the patient’s lived experience without preconceptions, while psychopathology allows phenomenology to explore human plurality more deeply. In this special issue we aimed to gather papers focusing on the intersection of phenomenology and psychopathology, examining key concepts, contemporary challenges, and clinical applications.  Topics of interest include: the theoretical and practical advancements of phenomenological psychopathology the role of embodiment emotions like envy and melancholy in disorders  the use of phenomenological methodologies like interviews in clinical settings.  Key phenomenological concepts such as epoche, int

Today's post is by Susana Mons ó who presents her new book Playing Possum: How Animals Understand Death   (Princeton, 2024).  Susana Monsó  is associate professor of philosophy in the Department of Logic, History, and Philosophy of Science at the National Distance Education University (UNED) in Madrid. She specialises in philosophy of animal minds, animal ethics, and philosophy of comparative psychology. Humans have traditionally thought of themselves as the only animals with a concept of death. Yet, recent years have witnessed a surge of studies that suggest that we may not be the only ones intrigued by this phenomenon. A chimpanzee was seen cleaning the teeth of the corpse of an adolescent of her group with whom she was closely bonded, crows will gather around the bodies of deceased conspecifics to learn about the circumstances of their death, elephants calves have been discovered seemingly buried by their elders, an orca mother was seen carrying her dead baby for seventeen d

On 26th and 27th September in Berlin, the Human Abilities Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities organised a workshop on conspiracy beliefs and delusions. This is a report of the workshop. Logo of the Human Abilities centre The first speaker was Romy Jaster (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) presented a talk on self-immunization in conspiracy theories. Romy thinks about conspiracy theories from an epistemological and philosophy of science perspective and she started her presentation with the conceptual distinction between "conspiracy theories" as a neutral term (an explanation that involves a conspiracy) and "conspiracy theories" as a negatively-valued term (an explanation that is epistemically deficient). What the epistemic deficit is is open to debate and controversy.  Romy focused on the idea that conspiracy theories and delusions are both deficient because they are not responsive to counter-evidence. The idea is that conspiracy theories are built in such a