Imperfect Cognitions

Jules Holroyd I am a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Nottingham. I've recently been working on implicit social cognitions in responsible agency - in particular, implicit biases. Implicit biases are, roughly, stored associations in memory, which can operate without the conscious awareness of the agent, and influence judgements and behaviours. We have many implicit associations and some of these enable us to navigate the world effectively. But others - those falling under the rubric of 'implicit bias' - seem deeply problematic and have a role in perpetuating discrimination and disadvantage (for a great resource on implicit bias, see here ).

Magdalena Antrobus I am a Masters student in Philosophy of Health and Happiness at the University of Birmingham. I also hold a Masters degree in Clinical Psychology and have over 5 years experience in clinical practice, working mainly with psychosis, depression, eating disorders and manic - depressive illness in conjunction with addictions (so-called dual diagnosis).  In my recent work I examined possible beneficial traits of manic-depressive illness (Bipolar Disorder). At first glance it may sound surprising to place ‘bipolar’ and ‘positive’ in the same sentence. However, a thorough study and analyses conducted by some psychiatrists ( Galvez, Thommi, Ghaemi, 2011 , Ghaemi 2012a , Ghaemi, 2012b ) discovered that having the illness might enhance particular characteristics that are seen as beneficial. The authors of one of the studies reviewed 81 examples that mentioned positive psychological qualities in individuals diagnosed with manic depressive illness and found a strong asso

Kengo Miyazono with Charles Darwin I am a research fellow at University of Birmingham and a JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) fellow. My main research area is philosophy of mind, broadly construed (including philosophy of psychology, philosophy of psychiatry and early modern philosophy of mind). Recently, I am working on a project which is, directly or indirectly, related to epistemic innocence project. The aim of this project is to present and develop a new strategy to defend doxasticism about delusion from the main argument against it.  Doxasticism about delusion is the view that delusions are beliefs. Although this view is widely accepted in psychiatry, there is a simple but powerful philosophical argument against it. I call it “the argument from causal role”. - Playing a belief-like causal role is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. - Many delusions fail to play belief-like causal roles. - Therefore, many delusions are not beliefs.