Colin Klein works on the philosophy of neuroscience at The Australian National University, and is interested in delusions and related phenomena.
For example, it has sometimes been claimed that conspiracy theorists possess a “monological” belief system, in which belief in one conspiracy leads to belief in others, until eventually a person explains every significant event, however unrelated, through the same conspiracy “logic”. This conception of conspiracy theorists has also influenced the philosophical and psychological literature on delusions.
As philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in rationality, beliefs, and delusions, we found this picture highly suspect. Surely there can be many ways into conspiracy beliefs, just as there can be many ways into other kinds of beliefs. Perhaps the “monological” view arises from a selection bias: typical “monological” conspiracy theorists do exist, but their voluminous, florid outpourings tend to stand out more, obscuring a greater heterogeneity among conspiracy believers generally.
Colin Klein |
Peter Clutton is a graduate student in philosophy at The Australian National University, working on delusions and beliefs. is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Cognitive Science at Macquarie University, interested in belief formation, self representation, and altered states of consciousness.
Peter Clutton |
Vince Polito is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Cognitive Science at Macquarie University, interested in belief formation, self representation, and altered states of consciousness.
Vince Polito |
Conspiracy theorists are often thought to be distinctively irrational. When you picture a conspiracy theorist, you might imagine someone scouring the internet and joining dots between seemingly unrelated events, constructing a grand web of interconnected conspiracies in order to explain the mundane chaos of everyday life. Intuitively, it seems, there must be some fundamental epistemic or psychological error behind such activity.
For example, it has sometimes been claimed that conspiracy theorists possess a “monological” belief system, in which belief in one conspiracy leads to belief in others, until eventually a person explains every significant event, however unrelated, through the same conspiracy “logic”. This conception of conspiracy theorists has also influenced the philosophical and psychological literature on delusions.
As philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in rationality, beliefs, and delusions, we found this picture highly suspect. Surely there can be many ways into conspiracy beliefs, just as there can be many ways into other kinds of beliefs. Perhaps the “monological” view arises from a selection bias: typical “monological” conspiracy theorists do exist, but their voluminous, florid outpourings tend to stand out more, obscuring a greater heterogeneity among conspiracy believers generally.