This post is by Maria Silvia Salvatori, a Master’s degree student in Philosophy, already holding a Bachelor’s degree in Philosophical Sciences from the University of Bologna, with a background in classical studies, editorial communication, and cognitive sciences. Currently working as a professional educator in primary education, with academic interests in philosophy of mind, delusions, and human cognition. Maria Silvia Salvatori Martha's clinical case, who is discussed by Sabine Spielrein at the Burghölzli clinic in the early twentieth century, is not merely the record of a psychiatric case, but an epistemological mirror. By analysing her delusion, crucial questions emerge: What is the difference between psychotic belief and ordinary belief? Is there an inner logic in pathological language that can "translate" across cognitive sciences and biological science? Architectures of a Mind Martha N. is described by Spielrein in terms of incoherent affect and a confused, someti...
This week's post is by Joshua Sealy (Macquarie University) on his recent paper Redefining disability and pathology as both developmental and relational: the ‘phenomenological congruence and flexibility’ approach to disability in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Joshua Sealy A popular sentiment in the deaf community is that deafness is not a disability, it is a ‘difference’, with deaf cultures all over the world acting as sources of various values and habits associated with sight, touch, sign language, and solidarity. On the other hand, deafness is hearing impairment, a dysfunction of the deaf person’s ear and/or brain; a disability. Many assume an irreconcilable tension between the two positions. But growing up as a deaf person, I knew intuitively that both positions were true at the same time. The solution required addressing messy definitions of ability, disability, impairment, and pathology. Indeed, a deaf person can be ‘healthy’ despite their disabi...