This weeks post is by Marta Jorba (Pompeu Fabra University), Valentina Petrolini ( University of Bologna), and Bianca Cepollaro (University Vita-Salute San Raffaele). Presenting their recent paper open access ' Person-first and identity-first approaches to Autism: metaphysical and linguistic implications ' in Synthese. Marta Jorba “I am not a ‘person with autism’. I am an autistic person”. Although these words were first written by Jim Sinclair almost 30 years ago, we still come across heated debates on social media and other public venues regarding the most appropriate way to address autistic people and people with other mental health diagnoses. Some, following some trends in disability studies, voice the concern that “I am not my disability” and prefer to say: “I am a person with autism”. Others, following more recent neurodivergent activism, proudly refer to themselves through claims such as “I am autistic”. The former is an example of a person-first approach while the latt...
This week, we welcome Daniel Vespermann (Heidelberg University) and Sanna Karoliina Tirkkonen (University of Helsinki) to present their recent paper Existential injustice in phenomenological psychopathology in Philosophical Psychology. Sanna Karoliina Tirkkonen In our paper “Existential injustice in phenomenological psychopathology”, we discuss a particular type of affective injustice. We start from the widely shared premise in phenomenological psychopathology that distressing alterations of background feelings play an important role in challenging mental health conditions. Background feelings are standing states that orient our evaluative perceptions of the world, shape emotional patterns, and regulate how we relate to others. In our paper, we refer to feelings of insecurity, self-blame, anxiety, estrangement, or inferiority as examples of distressing background feelings. Phenomenological approaches to psychopathology usually treat alterations of background feeling...