Imperfect Cognitions

This weeks post is by Dr. Lena Wimmer, University of Würzburg. Presenting her recent paper Why Disinformation, Fake News, and Conspiracy Theories are not Fiction: A View From Philosophical Aesthetics and Literary Studies   published in  Review of Philosophy and Psychology Lena Wimmer    Not just in everyday conversations, but also in academic discussions, unreliable information – like misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories – is often compared to fiction. I want to question whether that comparison really holds up. First, let us clarify what we mean by these different kinds of unreliable information. All of them operate at the level of individual claims or statements. Misinformation is the broadest category: it simply refers to false information, no matter whether the person sharing it means to mislead or not. Disinformation is more specific – it is false information shared deliberately to deceive. Fake news is a form of disinformation that ...

This post is by Víctor Verdejo, one of the editors – together with José Luis Bermúdez and Matheus Valente – of the collection Sharing Thoughts: Philosophical Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Communication , recently published with Oxford University Press. He is a philosopher of mind and language, Ramón y Cajal fellow at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, and currently leads a number of research projects on communication, intersubjectivity and the self. More information can be found here . Cover of Sharing Thoughts Are you thinking what I am thinking? Well, it might be hard for you to know without further context, and in particular, without me telling you what that could be. But this way of talking certainly illustrates how natural and easy it is to consider the possibility of shared thoughts. We are all used to the idea that thoughts, ideas and experiences can be talked about, expressed and ultimately shared with our peers. And the force of this idea not only sits deeply with...

 Today’s post is by Brady Wagoner, Professor of Psychology at the University of Copenhagen and Aalborg University, Denmark. He published a recent article in Current Opinion in Psychology , together with Maja Sødinge Jørgensen and Kirstine Pahuus, titled “Conspiracy theories through the lens of collective memory”.   Brady Wagoner In psychology, c onspiracy theories are often treated as symptoms of faulty thinking: cognitive shortcuts gone wrong , paranoia, or failures of information literacy. This article develops an alternative approach through the lens of collective memory, which refers to the socially shared ways groups reconstruct the past to make sense of the present and anticipate the future. This perspective focuses on what conspiracy theories do, rather than what is wrong with those who believe them. It shifts attention from individual cognition as such to how thinking is embedded within history, culture, and social relations.   The article begins wi...

This post is by Anna Mameli, who attends secondary school and volunteers for The Philosophy Garden as part of her Duke of Edinburgh silver award. Anna reports on a paper recently published in a special issue of Revue Internationale de Philosophie on philosophy in the public sphere. Conceptual plumbing, an installation at the Philosophy Museum What are employers looking for? What do you need to successfully pass an interview? What helps you to win debates? Good epistemic skills. Epistemic skills allow you to gain, develop and use knowledge so that you can achieve your goals. This can be applied anywhere, from expressing your view in passionate debates in comment sections and discussing political issues with friends to deciding whether or not you should trust a source (e.g., when looking for medical advice) and convincingly presenting your point at work. These skills can be used for anything in your life! Learning good epistemic habits is essential for surviving in our society. So, ho...

This weeks post is by Marta Jorba (Pompeu Fabra University), Valentina Petrolini ( University of Bologna), and Bianca Cepollaro (University Vita-Salute San Raffaele). Presenting their recent paper open access ' Person-first and identity-first approaches to Autism: metaphysical and linguistic implications ' in  Synthese. Marta Jorba “I am not a ‘person with autism’. I am an autistic person”. Although these words were first written by Jim Sinclair almost 30 years ago, we still come across heated debates on social media and other public venues regarding the most appropriate way to address autistic people and people with other mental health diagnoses. Some, following some trends in disability studies, voice the concern that “I am not my disability” and prefer to say: “I am a person with autism”. Others, following more recent neurodivergent activism, proudly refer to themselves through claims such as “I am autistic”. The former is an example of a person-first approach while the latt...

This week, we welcome Daniel Vespermann (Heidelberg University) and Sanna Karoliina Tirkkonen (University of Helsinki) to present their recent paper Existential injustice in phenomenological psychopathology in  Philosophical Psychology.   Sanna Karoliina Tirkkonen   In our paper “Existential injustice in phenomenological psychopathology”, we discuss a particular type of affective injustice. We start from the widely shared premise in phenomenological psychopathology that distressing alterations of background feelings play an important role in challenging mental health conditions. Background feelings are standing states that orient our evaluative perceptions of the world, shape emotional patterns, and regulate how we relate to others. In our paper, we refer to feelings of insecurity, self-blame, anxiety, estrangement, or inferiority as examples of distressing background feelings. Phenomenological approaches to psychopathology usually treat alterations of background feeling...