In today’s post, Monica A. Ross explores how medicalised interpretations can shape how a person is understood and who they are taken to be. Monica is a psychotherapist and Visiting Scholar at UC Berkeley, whose work focuses on psychiatric classification, clinical records, and narrative identity. Monica A. Ross I am a psychotherapist with ten years of clinical experience. I have received several diagnoses over my lifetime, none of which adequately captures how I understand myself today. Perhaps we are all mad in different ways, at different moments, and to different degrees, though the consequences of being understood that way are unevenly distributed. People differ in how extensively their experiences are documented through psychiatric classifications and how closely they identify with them. What happens when a medicalised interpretation becomes durable enough to function as a fact about who a person is? Clinicians, patients, and others who encounter medical records may come...
This week's post is by Virginia Ballesteros, an assistant professor at the University of Valencia. Virginia Ballesteros In contemporary theories of social cognition, autism is predominantly framed through cognitivist paradigms, such as "theory of mind" or "simulation theory". These frameworks treat social understanding as an individualistic, internalist epistemic puzzle: the challenge of knowing the inaccessible mental states of others from one's own isolated mind. From this perspective, autistic difficulties are construed as impairments in the cognitive faculties or neural machinery required to make the inferences or simulations needed to read the mental states of others. In contrast, approaches rooted in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy aim not to solve this puzzle, but to dissolve it. From a Wittgensteinian standpoint, minds are not hidden, private entities; rather, emotions, intentions, and psychological states are visibly manifested in behavior, gestu...