This week's post is by Virginia Ballesteros, an assistant professor at the University of Valencia. Virginia Ballesteros In contemporary theories of social cognition, autism is predominantly framed through cognitivist paradigms, such as "theory of mind" or "simulation theory". These frameworks treat social understanding as an individualistic, internalist epistemic puzzle: the challenge of knowing the inaccessible mental states of others from one's own isolated mind. From this perspective, autistic difficulties are construed as impairments in the cognitive faculties or neural machinery required to make the inferences or simulations needed to read the mental states of others. In contrast, approaches rooted in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy aim not to solve this puzzle, but to dissolve it. From a Wittgensteinian standpoint, minds are not hidden, private entities; rather, emotions, intentions, and psychological states are visibly manifested in behavior, gestu...
On today’s post, Mara Floris explores the role of existing medical evidence in identifying instances of epistemic injustice. Mara is a philosophy of science researcher at Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele in Milan, working on epistemic injustice, healthcare communication, and gender-fair language. Mara Floris Recent debates on epistemic injustice in healthcare have raised an important methodological question: how can we establish that epistemic injustice is occurring? Nielsen et al. (2025) argue that the field needs clearer conceptual criteria and stronger empirical evidence, particularly for claims about testimonial injustice. A response by members of the EPIC project develops this discussion, arguing for an empirically informed but methodologically pluralistic approach (Byrne et al., 2026) . Færge et al (2026) similarly emphasise methodological pluralism. My recent paper takes this discussion in another direction: we need better ways of identifying epistemic injustice, but shoul...