I'm Ryan McKay , Professor of Psychology at Royal Holloway, University of London , and head of the Royal Holloway Morality and Beliefs Lab (MaB-Lab) . I'm interested in how we form and revise beliefs, including delusional beliefs. This post is a summary of my article “Measles, Magic and Misidentifications: A Defence of the Two-Factor Theory of Delusions” in reply to Phil Cortlett's recent paper discussed on the blog last week . The Two-Factor Theory of Delusions One may (a) interpret data falsely, but also (b) receive false data for interpretation. ~ Southard, 1912 , p. 328. The idea that delusions arise when individuals attempt to interpret “false data” has been incorporated in several theories of delusions. Two-factor theorists, however (e.g., Coltheart et al., 2011; Davies & Coltheart, 2000 ; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000 ), view deluded individuals both as “receiving false data for interpretation” (factor one, which furnishes the content of the del...
A blog at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and mental health