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Showing posts with the label diminished responsibility

Respect for People with (Permanently) Imperfect Cognitions

This post is by Oliver Sensen  (pictured above), Associate Professor in Philosophy at Tulane University in New Orleans. Oliver is interested in the question of how one should treat others, and, more particularly, in the notion of respect for persons. Much of his work is on Kant – since he is the one who thought most deeply about these issues – including his notions of dignity ,  autonomy , and respect. In this post Oliver summarises his recent article ' Respect Towards Elderly Demented Patients ', published in Diametros. As part of a more systematic project on respect, I have started to think about the regard that is owed to people with imperfect cognitions. The paper I summarise in this post focuses on respect for elderly demented patients. Imagine that you are a caregiver for a patient who does not remember what happened yesterday. If, for instance, her husband died years ago, she still might ask you when he will come back to see her. Telling her the trut...

Neuroscience and Responsibility Workshop

Responsibility Project This post is by Benjamin Matheson , Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Gothenburg, working on the Gothenburg Responsibility Project . (Photos of workshop participants are by Gunnar Björnsson). The workshop on ‘Neuroscience and Responsibility’, part of the Gothenburg Responsibility Project, took place in 14 November 20145. The conference was well attended, the talks were informative, and the discussion was lively and productive. Michael Moore (Illinois) kicked things off with his talk ‘Nothing But a Pack of Neurons: Responsible Reductionism About the Mental States that Measure Moral Culpability’. Part of Moore’s current project is to show that reductionism (roughly, the view that mental states are just brain states) is not a threat to our responsibility practices – that is to say, we can still be morally and legally responsible even if mental states reduce to brain states. The worry is that if mental states reduce to brain states, then it is not ...