 |
| Jules Holroyd |
Implicit associations are discerned in experimental settings, whereby the differential speed of pairing items (such as black faces and white faces with positive vs negative terms) is taken to indicate the strength of associations held. Experimental evidence indicates that these implicit associations manifest in other, more worrying contexts: the differential evaluation of CVs with the same (identical!) qualifications but from different genders; the differential hiring recommendations for equally moderately qualified black and white job applicants; the greater readiness to identify as a gun an indeterminate object when in a black, rather than white, man's hand (for an overview, see Jost et al. 2009).
One general question is what the role
of these implicit cognitions in individual agency is. Not all
implicit cognitions are prima facie problematic in the ways that
those described above are. Can they be epistemically innocent, or
even valuable? How should we model agency given the role of implicit,
as well as explicit processes in the production of action?
A specific question I have looked at in
some detail (Holroyd 2012) concerns whether individuals should be
held responsible for being influenced by morally problematic implicit
biases. I identify a range of considerations that have been appealed
to in support of the idea that individuals are not morally
responsible for being influenced by such implicit associations:
i) that the agent is not causally
responsible for the presence of such associations;
ii) that individuals lack the relevant
kind of control over their operation;
iii) that individuals are unaware of
their operation;
iv) that implicit biases are not
responsive to reasons.
I have argued that with respect to each
of these claims, there is reason to hold either that the condition
posited as necessary for moral responsibility should not be accepted
(i and ii), or that empirical evidence indicates that the condition
is at least sometimes met (iii and iv).
For example, an argument such as the
following, for exempting individuals from responsibility for being
influenced by bias, might be offered (for versions of this argument
see Saul, Levy 2012):
(i) Individuals cannot be held
responsible for cognitive processes or influences on behaviour and
judgment over which they do not have control.
(ii) Manifesting—being influenced in
behavior and judgment by—implicit biases is not under an agent’s
control.
(iii) Therefore, individuals cannot be
held responsible for the influence of implicit biases on behavior and
judgment.
One strategy for evaluating this
argument is to consider exactly what sense of control is at issue
(direct control? rational control? ability to inhibit or intervene?
In a work in progress, Dan Kelly and I evaluate different versions of
the control argument, and argue that ecological control can be
sufficient for responsibility for implicit biases).
In my 2012 paper, I argue that it is
plausible to suppose that indirect control is, at least sometimes,
the relevant sense of control for responsibility, and that on this
interpretation, premise ii will be false. There is some evidence that
suggests that for some implicit associations (race and
negative/positive word associations), the extent to which it
influences action is correlated with the individual's explicit
beliefs about the importance of non-prejudiced behaviour or goals to
treat people fairly (see Devine et al 2002, Moskowitz & Li 2011).
We might exert control over the manifestation of implicit biases
indirectly, then, via change in our beliefs and goals. Insofar as
individuals may have indirect control in this way, then it is not
obvious that there are grounds related to lack of control for not
holding individuals responsible for implicit biases.
In future work I aim to look in more detail at the kinds of control we might have over implicit cognitions, whether implicit cognitions differ from each other in important ways (in progress, with Joseph Sweetman) and the role of holding each other responsible in regulating the expression of implicit biases.