Ken Pepper This post is by Ken Pepper , who recently submitted his PhD at the University of York. Amputees often feel 'phantom' sensations emanating from their missing limb (for a review, see Giummarra et al 2007 ). This entry discusses the role of action and perception in the constitution of these physically absent yet phenomenally present body parts. I urge the view that phantoms are to some extent enactive – they are constituted by active perceptual engagement with the world (see e.g. Noë 2004 ). Impressed by the way in which a blind man localised sensations at the tip of his cane, Head and Homes ( 1911 ) hypothesised that his brain must update its representation of bodily posture on the fly and treat the cane as part of his arm. It turns out that they were correct; neural representations of limb locations are highly adaptable and continually modified by vision, touch, and kinaesthesia. Experiments on macaques reveal that while using a rake to retrieve food, the recep...
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