This post is by Dorothea Debus (pictured below), who is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of York. Her research is on topics in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology.
At present, I am thinking about our ability to 'engage in future-directed mental time travel', that is, our ability to imagine future events. More specifically, I am interested in cases in which we imagine future events in a vivid, experiential way. For example, try to imagine what you are going to do this coming Sunday. Chances are that when you really try to do this, you will have some vivid imaginary experiences of the things you might hope to do, and the situations you might hope to encounter.
Clearly, such experiential, or 'sensory', imaginations of future events have a characteristic temporal orientation - that is, they are directed towards the future, rather than the past or the present. In an attempt to account for this feature, I show that the context in which relevant experiences occur can ground their temporal orientation. More precisely, I argue that in order for a sensorily imagined event to be temporally located in the future, it is sufficient that the relevant imagination occur in a context of future-directed thoughts or beliefs, whose content is relevantly related to the content of the sensory imagination.
Secondly, when we sensorily imagine future events, the future does seem 'open' in a way in which the past and the present are not. I argue that this 'openness' should be understood as 'agential' opennenss: When a subject sensorily imagines a future event, the subject is aware of the fact that she herself, or others, might act in ways that could bring about, or prevent, the actual future onset and occurrence of the very event which she sensorily imagines now, and the subject's awareness of this fact is a constitutive feature of a sensory imagination of a future event.
Indeed, the experience of a sensory imagination of a future event can, and often does, make the imagining subject engage in subsequent actions with respect to the imagined future event which she would not otherwise have engaged in, and these actions will in turn have an effect on whether or not the relevant event will occur. Thus, a present sensory imagination of a future event can have an effect on how things develop with respect to that very event. Sensory imaginations of future events therefore can be of value if they have a good effect on how things develop with respect to the relevant event, and they can be harmful if they have a bad effect on it.
What is more, mature healthy subjects usually have a primitive understanding of the ways in which certain sensory imaginations of future events might make them act (or not act) with respect to the relevant future events, and thus which effects relevant sensory imaginations of future events might have on the actual occurrence (or non-occurrence) of relevant imagined future events. Indeed, everyday (self-)observation suggests that subjects sometimes set out to (and sometimes successfully do) shape the future by means of making themselves have certain sensory imaginations of future events.
Thus, we find that maybe the greatest value that sensory imaginations of future events have lies in the fact that subjects can, and sometimes do, put their ability to sensorily imagine future events to good use and thereby shape the future for the better. Quite analogously, maybe the greatest harmful potential which sensory imaginations of future events have lies in the fact that subjects can, and sometimes do, put their ability to sensorily imagine future events to bad use and thereby shape the future for the worse. Given their potentially substantial effects, we find that we have good reason to take care of which future events we set out to sensorily imagine, and of how we set out to sensorily imagine them.
The ideas sketched here are developed more fully in a paper that is to appear in Michaelian, K., Klein, S. B., and Szpunar, K. (eds.), Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Time Travel, Oxford University Press (under contract, forthcoming) - so if you are curious, you will be able to read on there soon!
Clearly, such experiential, or 'sensory', imaginations of future events have a characteristic temporal orientation - that is, they are directed towards the future, rather than the past or the present. In an attempt to account for this feature, I show that the context in which relevant experiences occur can ground their temporal orientation. More precisely, I argue that in order for a sensorily imagined event to be temporally located in the future, it is sufficient that the relevant imagination occur in a context of future-directed thoughts or beliefs, whose content is relevantly related to the content of the sensory imagination.
Secondly, when we sensorily imagine future events, the future does seem 'open' in a way in which the past and the present are not. I argue that this 'openness' should be understood as 'agential' opennenss: When a subject sensorily imagines a future event, the subject is aware of the fact that she herself, or others, might act in ways that could bring about, or prevent, the actual future onset and occurrence of the very event which she sensorily imagines now, and the subject's awareness of this fact is a constitutive feature of a sensory imagination of a future event.
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| Credit: Dan Salaman, Wellcome Images |
Indeed, the experience of a sensory imagination of a future event can, and often does, make the imagining subject engage in subsequent actions with respect to the imagined future event which she would not otherwise have engaged in, and these actions will in turn have an effect on whether or not the relevant event will occur. Thus, a present sensory imagination of a future event can have an effect on how things develop with respect to that very event. Sensory imaginations of future events therefore can be of value if they have a good effect on how things develop with respect to the relevant event, and they can be harmful if they have a bad effect on it.
What is more, mature healthy subjects usually have a primitive understanding of the ways in which certain sensory imaginations of future events might make them act (or not act) with respect to the relevant future events, and thus which effects relevant sensory imaginations of future events might have on the actual occurrence (or non-occurrence) of relevant imagined future events. Indeed, everyday (self-)observation suggests that subjects sometimes set out to (and sometimes successfully do) shape the future by means of making themselves have certain sensory imaginations of future events.
Thus, we find that maybe the greatest value that sensory imaginations of future events have lies in the fact that subjects can, and sometimes do, put their ability to sensorily imagine future events to good use and thereby shape the future for the better. Quite analogously, maybe the greatest harmful potential which sensory imaginations of future events have lies in the fact that subjects can, and sometimes do, put their ability to sensorily imagine future events to bad use and thereby shape the future for the worse. Given their potentially substantial effects, we find that we have good reason to take care of which future events we set out to sensorily imagine, and of how we set out to sensorily imagine them.
The ideas sketched here are developed more fully in a paper that is to appear in Michaelian, K., Klein, S. B., and Szpunar, K. (eds.), Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Time Travel, Oxford University Press (under contract, forthcoming) - so if you are curious, you will be able to read on there soon!