Skip to main content

Agency in Youth Mental Health (3): Rose McCabe

This post is the third in a series of posts on a project on agency and youth mental health funded by a MRC/AHRC/ESRC Adolescence, Mental Health and the Developing Mind: Engagement Award and led by Rose McCabe at City University. The research team members were asked the same four questions and today it is Rose McCabe's turn to answer.


Rose McCabe


Rose is a psychologist specialising in professional-patient communication in mental health care. She records professional-patient encounters and micro-analyses verbal and nonverbal communication. She also works on translating these findings into novel interventions to improve communication and patient outcomes in mental healthcare. 




What interests you about clinical encounters with young people in the mental health context?

I am fascinated by communication between people and how it has the potential to impact us in a good or bad way. In a mental health context, when someone is distressed and vulnerable, this becomes even more important. Young people who are distressed may be particularly vulnerable and struggling to understand what is happening and why it is happening to them. 

There is a lot of self-stigma and societal stigma around seeking help for mental health difficulties and young people are putting their trust in people in positions of power to support them. Often these conversations go well but unfortunately sometimes they do not go well. This can have a profound impact and sometimes means young people will not seek help in the future when they may really need it.

Why is the focus on agency important in this context?

As agency is to do with our sense of being in control of our lives and decisions that affect our lives, it is important to think about how this plays out with young people in distress in mental health encounters. When we feel depressed or anxious, hear voices or have intrusive thoughts, this can make us feel like we are not in control. Young people may also be treated as not having agency by adults who think they are immature and not yet able to reliably report on their experiences or make good decisions about their mental health.

What do your experience and disciplinary background bring to the project?

I bring experience of analysing communication and working closely with people with lived experience and professionals to the project. I video record clinical encounters and analyse verbal and non-verbal communication in-depth, looking for obvious and less things that go well and not so well. An example of something obvious might be a professional encouraging someone by saying something like “You have been going through a really difficult time, you did the right thing in coming to see us and we are here to support you”. 

A less obvious, but really important aspect, might be a professional’s tone of voice when they talk to a young person (e.g. a patronising tone) or when a young person disengages nonverbally in the encounter and you can see they are losing trust in the professional. I have worked on communication surrounding self-harm in primary care, sharing a diagnosis of dementia, training to improve communication with people with psychosis, and shared decision making.

What do you hope to see as an outcome of this project?

I have enjoyed working with an advisory group of young people so much on this project and I am hoping that their views, experiences and recommendations will be used in training health professionals (and other people who support young people like teachers) to have better mental health conversations. 

There are some very fundamental and important things that are often missing from these conversations, particularly really listening to understand the young person, acknowledging that they are distressed and validating their decision to seek help. I hope that young people can be directly involved in training people who support them when they have mental health difficulties.




Popular posts from this blog

Delusions in the DSM 5

This post is by Lisa Bortolotti. How has the definition of delusions changed in the DSM 5? Here are some first impressions. In the DSM-IV (Glossary) delusions were defined as follows: Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.

Rationalization: Why your intelligence, vigilance and expertise probably don't protect you

Today's post is by Jonathan Ellis , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Public Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Eric Schwitzgebel , Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. This is the first in a two-part contribution on their paper "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical thought" in Moral Inferences , eds. J. F. Bonnefon and B. Trémolière (Psychology Press, 2017). We’ve all been there. You’re arguing with someone – about politics, or a policy at work, or about whose turn it is to do the dishes – and they keep finding all kinds of self-serving justifications for their view. When one of their arguments is defeated, rather than rethinking their position they just leap to another argument, then maybe another. They’re rationalizing –coming up with convenient defenses for what they want to believe, rather than responding even-handedly to the points you're making. Yo

A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind

Today's post is by  Karen Yan (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) on her recent paper (co-authored with Chuan-Ya Liao), " A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind " ( Synthese 2023). Karen Yan What drives us to write this paper is our curiosity about what it means when philosophers of mind claim their works are informed by empirical evidence and how to assess this quality of empirically-informedness. Building on Knobe’s (2015) quantitative metaphilosophical analyses of empirically-informed philosophy of mind (EIPM), we investigated further how empirically-informed philosophers rely on empirical research and what metaphilosophical lessons to draw from our empirical results.  We utilize scientometric tools and categorization analysis to provide an empirically reliable description of EIPM. Our methodological novelty lies in integrating the co-citation analysis tool with the conceptual resources from the philosoph