Imperfect Cognitions

On 26th and 27th September in Berlin, the Human Abilities Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities organised a workshop on conspiracy beliefs and delusions. This is a report of the workshop. Logo of the Human Abilities centre The first speaker was Romy Jaster (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) presented a talk on self-immunization in conspiracy theories. Romy thinks about conspiracy theories from an epistemological and philosophy of science perspective and she started her presentation with the conceptual distinction between "conspiracy theories" as a neutral term (an explanation that involves a conspiracy) and "conspiracy theories" as a negatively-valued term (an explanation that is epistemically deficient). What the epistemic deficit is is open to debate and controversy.  Romy focused on the idea that conspiracy theories and delusions are both deficient because they are not responsive to counter-evidence. The idea is that conspiracy theories are built in such a

In this post, Amelia Gangemi and Valentina Cardella introduce their new book, Reasoning in Psychopathology  (Routledge 2024). Reasoning in Psychopathology Rationality can be broadly categorized into two types: rationality of action, which concerns behavior appropriate to achieving one’s goals, and theoretical rationality, which involves conformity to norms, such as logical or social norms. Many philosophers and psychologists argue that a key aspect of mental disorder is a deficiency in rational control over one’s behavior. This notion is consistent with the common view that mental illness involves a lack of discipline or self-control. Contrary to this view, individuals with mental disorders do not necessarily exhibit impaired rationality. In our book, we present studies of schizophrenia, depression, and anxiety disorders that suggest that individuals with these conditions can reason logically within their symptomatic domains and may even outperform unaffected individuals on certain tas