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On Phenomenological Psychopathology

In this post, Susi Ferrarello, Francesca Brencio, Valeria Bizzari and Magnus Englander present a recent special issue of Frontiers in Psychology entitled: "Phenomenological Psychopathology: Who, What and How? An analysis of key figures, advancements and challenges”. 


Valeria Bizzari

Phenomenology offers psychopathology a framework for understanding the patient’s lived experience without preconceptions, while psychopathology allows phenomenology to explore human plurality more deeply. In this special issue we aimed to gather papers focusing on the intersection of phenomenology and psychopathology, examining key concepts, contemporary challenges, and clinical applications. 

Topics of interest include:

  • the theoretical and practical advancements of phenomenological psychopathology
  • the role of embodiment
  • emotions like envy and melancholy in disorders 
  • the use of phenomenological methodologies like interviews in clinical settings. 

Key phenomenological concepts such as epoche, intersubjectivity, lived time, and first-person perspectives have contributed significantly to understanding disorders like autism, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Such an understanding can contribute to the integration of people with those diagnoses into society.


Francesca Brencio


Notable articles include a discussion on the role of imagination and affectivity in schizophrenia by Mauro Senatore and the exploration of schizophrenic selfhood by Alessandro Guardascione. The issue also features research on cultural dimensions of psychosis by Alphonsus and colleagues, who study self-boundary disruptions in a sociocentric culture.

The issue also tackles the autism mental health crisis, with Themistoklis Pantazakos and Gert-Jan Vanake advocating for neurodiversity-affirming clinical practices, while Joona Taipale explores sensory modifications in autism, offering new perspectives on tactile experiences.


Susi Ferrarello

Other significant contributions include Rozemund Uljée's work on the unconscious in intersubjective systems theory, which links Husserlian phenomenology to psychoanalysis. Further, an article by Juan Pablo Zapata-Ospina and colleagues explores the phenomenological differences between adjustment disorder and major depressive episodes, and Andrés Sánchez Guerrero's research offers a nuanced phenomenological analysis of adolescent depression.


Magnus Englander

The special issue brings together diverse perspectives and empirical applications of phenomenology to enhance understanding and treatment of mental health disorders. By examining the subjective experiences of individuals, phenomenological psychopathology seeks to equip clinicians and scholars with deeper insights into mental health care and the possibilities of phenomenological methods. 


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