Folk Intuitions about Free Will: Falure to Understand Determinism and Motivated Cognition

Today's post is by Kiichi Inarimori (Hokkaido University) on his recent paper "Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Evaluating the Combined Effects of Misunderstandings About Determinism and Motivated Cognition" (Cognitive Science 2024), co-authored with Yusuke Haruki (The University of Tokyo) and Kengo Miyazono (Hokkaido University).

Kiichi Inarimori

Philosophers have long debated whether free will—a prerequisite for moral responsibility—is compatible with determinism. Central to these discussions are the intuitions people form when considering moral responsibility in hypothetical scenarios.

Yusuke Haruki

With the rise of experimental philosophy, numerous studies have explored folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Some experiments suggest that people tend toward “compatibilism,” the view that free will and determinism can coexist, especially in concrete cases of wrongdoing. Others suggest a lean toward “incompatibilism,” the view that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Kengo Miyazono

Why do these intuitions vary so much? One possible explanation lies in misunderstandings of determinism. It has been shown that many people mistakenly equate causal determination with bypassing—the idea that mental states like desires and beliefs have no causal role in actions. It is also suggested that many people fail to grasp that determinism excludes alternative possibilities (intrusion). These misunderstandings can influence responses: bypassing is associated with increased incompatibilist responses, while intrusion tends to increase compatibilist responses. Another possible explanation is motivated cognition. Studies by Cory Clark and colleagues suggest that attributions of free will and responsibility may be influenced by a desire to hold wrongdoers accountable.

Our recent study, published in Cognitive Science, aimed to uncover why people exhibit such divergent intuitions. We focused on two key factors: misunderstandings about determinism and the desire to punish wrongdoers, which is hypothesized to be linked with compatibilist responses.

To investigate these effects, we conducted a large-scale experiment with over 1,000 participants in Japan. Participants were presented with scenarios describing deterministic worlds and asked to evaluate whether a person committing a morally significant act (like murder) acted of their own free will and whether they should be held morally responsible.

A unique feature of our study was the use of new materials designed to improve comprehension of determinism. For instance, we created video explanations contrasting a deterministic universe with a non-deterministic one, alongside traditional text-based descriptions. We also assessed participants’ understanding of determinism, measuring their susceptibility to bypassing and intrusion. In addition, participants were asked to report their desire to punish the wrongdoer in each scenario.

Our findings were illuminating. While misunderstandings about determinism—especially bypassing—were common, they only partially explained participants’ responses. Intrusion effects, in particular, were minimal, as most participants correctly understood that determinism excludes alternative possibilities. A more significant predictor of moral responsibility attributions was participants’ retributive desires. Those with stronger desires to punish wrongdoers were significantly more likely to attribute free will and moral responsibility—even when they conflated causal determination with bypassing.

These results suggest that intuitions about free will and moral responsibility are more malleable than previously assumed. People appear to hold both compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions, and motivational factors, such as a desire for punishment, play a crucial role in shaping which intuition dominates. For philosophers, this raises challenging questions about the traditional dichotomy between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

However, our study did not establish a causal relationship between retributive desire and responsibility attribution, even though the association was clear. Additionally, we found significant scenario effects: participants’ responses depended on how deterministic scenarios were presented. These findings highlight the complexity of folk intuitions and suggest that understanding their formation requires careful attention to both cognitive and emotional factors.

While our study is just one step toward unpacking these dynamics, it underscores the need for further research across diverse contexts and cultures. By better understanding these mechanisms, we can gain deeper insights into how people navigate fundamental questions about free will and responsibility.