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Explaining the cultural impact of reason

This week's blogpost is from Stefaan Blancke (Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Science at Tilburg University) on his recent publication Objectify and Commit: How Reasons Bring About Cultural Change and Progress (Topoi, 2025)

Deinze, the town where I live, was destroyed three times in the Middle Ages. Each time, it was attacked by Ghent, a city barely twenty kilometers away. The reason? Deinzeconsistently sided with Bruges in its conflict with Ghent. When at one point Bruges decided to dig a canal to Deinze, Ghent sent out a militia to kill the diggers. No more diggers, no more canal.

Stefaan Blancke


Today it is unimaginable that cities in Flanders or elsewhere would settle their conflicts (if any) in such a violent manner. Our planet is far from peaceful, but humans seem to have made some moral progress. The same can be said of our understanding of the world. We have replaced religion, magic, and superstition with a profound scientific understanding of the world and ourselves.

Reason is believed to play an important role in moral and epistemic progress. By reasoning we recognize the faults in our beliefs and behavior and consequently replace them with better justified alternatives. For instance, we realize that we cannot discriminate against others because they are born with a different skin color and consequently our society becomes less racist. Darwin debunks creationism and hence the scientific world adopts evolutionary theory. How exactly the micro-level process of reasoning brings about its macro-level cultural effects, however, is often assumed rather than explained and therefore requires further scientific attention.

In my recent paper “Objectify and commit: How reasons bring about cultural change and progress” I propose to answer this question. I argue that the causal mechanism underlying the cultural impact of reasons consists of two steps. The first step is that people make their reasons more objective to convince others and justify themselves. They can do this by appealing to shared interests, the supernatural or to facts. In the marketplace of reasons, objectivized reasons will more likely be adopted by the audience and thus stand a better chance of becoming cultural. For instance, one could claim to oppose Covid restrictions because one resents them but that reason will probably not impress many,

However, when one claims to defy the restrictions because one fights for freedom, then the motivation stems from a noble goal that concerns everyone. This justification is also useful to other opponents who are then more likely to adopt it as well.

The second step is that objective reasons come with a cost. To avoid reputational damage, people must commit to the new standards associated with the reasons they produce. The more people become committed to them, the more likely they will adjust their beliefs and behavior accordingly. When we zoom out from these individual changes we observe cultural change and, sometimes, progress. For instance, when people invoke universal human rights to improve their own situation and/or their reputation, they are then committed to care for the rights of other marginalized groups as well. When people appeal to facts – strongly objectivized reasons – they are bound to think, speak and act in ways that accord with them. In such cases, reasoning results in moral and epistemic progress.

Reputation management plays a key role in the process. Because of reputational concerns people objectivize their reasons and feel compelled to commit to them. This also means that people objectivize their reasons to the extent their audience demands, which explains why reasoning does not necessarily result in good outcomes. It is crucial to understand how and when reputation plays its positive role and when it does not. As suggested by the fact that today I can live in Deinze without having to fear an invasion by Ghent, this might truly be a matter of life and death.

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