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| Helen Beebee |
Women are unquestionably underrepresented in philosophy. In
the UK, women make up about half of all philosophy undergraduates, but only
about 30% of PhD candidates and 20% of professors – a figure nearly as low as
in STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). The numbers are similar in the USA, Australia and elsewhere. There are
doubtless many and varied reasons for this, but – in a discipline in which,
like STEM disciplines, the dominant stereotype is male – implicit bias surely
plays a major role.
The BPA and SWIP have recently launched a ‘good practice’ scheme for philosophy departments, learned societies, journals and research projects. Quite a few of our recommendations concerns ways in which implicit bias might be reduced. Are all the pictures of eminent philosophers in your department’s corridor or seminar room pictures of men? Is your list of seminar or conference speakers dominated by men? Do the men in the room do most of the talking in philosophical discussions? These are all things we can easily fix – or at least try to.
The BPA and SWIP have recently launched a ‘good practice’ scheme for philosophy departments, learned societies, journals and research projects. Quite a few of our recommendations concerns ways in which implicit bias might be reduced. Are all the pictures of eminent philosophers in your department’s corridor or seminar room pictures of men? Is your list of seminar or conference speakers dominated by men? Do the men in the room do most of the talking in philosophical discussions? These are all things we can easily fix – or at least try to.
Like Jules Holroyd, I am sceptical about the claim that we
aren’t morally responsible for behaviour and judgements that result from
implicit biases. In particular, even if we aren’t in control of the biases
themselves, it doesn’t follow that we aren’t in control of behaviour and
judgements that those biases are (in part) responsible for. After all, if we
start down that road, it will be hard to resist the conclusion that nobody is
ever morally responsible for anything they do – given that all our behaviour is
caused at least in part by factors beyond our control. And I think there are
principled reasons for rejecting that conclusion.
On the other hand, when it comes to the practical matter of
changing the practices of actual philosophers and philosophical institutions,
finger-pointing is unlikely to be a very productive way to proceed. All we need
to recognise is that relevant implicit biases exist, that they can lead to
practices that are likely to result in a disproportionate number of women
leaving the profession, and that that is a bad thing.
Why is it a bad thing? Well, it’s bad for the women who
leave, because they end up failing to pursue the career they wanted to pursue
for reasons that have nothing to do with any lack of ability. And it’s bad for
philosophy, because the profession is deprived of many talented philosophers.
So doing everything we reasonably can to minimise the
effects of implicit bias is, I think, an obligation on all of us.