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First-person perspectives and scientific inquiry of autism

Today’s post is by Sarah Arnaud (Clemson University) on her recent paper, "First-person perspectives and scientific inquiry of autism: towards an integrative approach" (Synthese 2023).

Sarah Arnaud

In my paper, "First-person perspectives and scientific inquiry of autism: towards an integrative approach," published in Synthese, I analyse the essential role of first-person perspectives in enriching our comprehension of autism. This paper explores the interplay between scientific inquiry, activism, and the personal experiences of autistics, advocating for an approach that integrates insights from these varied sources.

The paper begins by confronting widespread misconceptions about autism, focusing particularly on the debate concerning the impact of science and activism in shaping our collective understanding of autism. I analyze the perspectives of Ian Hacking and Kenneth Kendler, two influential figures in this discourse. Hacking argues for the predominance of activism in influencing public perception and understanding of autism, while Kendler highlights the indispensable role of scientific research.

Moving beyond this debate, I critically evaluate the perceived dichotomy between scientific methodologies and activism in autism studies. I underline the significant contributions of the Neurodiversity movement and Critical Autism Studies, arguing that these perspectives have brought crucial comprehension to the autism discourse by effectively combining scientific research with activism. These approaches have not only enhanced our understanding but also fostered a more inclusive view of autism.

Central to my paper is the argument for incorporating autistic people’s perspectives in autism research. I claim that integrating these firsthand experiences is crucial for the validity of the autism category. This integration is examined through three distinct dimensions: content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity. Content validity deals with how comprehensively the autism category covers the diverse manifestations of autism. Criterion-related validity assesses the empirical correlations between the autism category and external standards, such as treatment responses. In the case of autism, the lack of response to alleged treatments is informative. Construct validity concerns the accuracy with which autism is differentiated from other categories and the effectiveness in identifying actual instances of autism.

A key aspect of my argument is the valuable and unique contributions that the perspectives of autistics bring. These perspectives not only challenge existing preconceptions and stereotypes about autism but also pave the way for more nuanced and accurate research. They offer a perspective through which we can understand the complexities of autism, leading to advancements in both theoretical and practical aspects of autism research.

In conclusion, I strongly advocate for an integrative approach to understanding autism, one that combines scientific research, activism, and the knowledge or experiences of autistic people. This approach, I argue, is indispensable for gaining a comprehensive and empathetic understanding of autism. Overall, my paper strongly supports the integration of autistics’ perspectives into the broader scientific research on autism. By challenging the traditional boundaries between science and activism, it highlights the need for an inclusive, multifaceted approach. This approach not only enriches our understanding of autism but also fosters a more inclusive society, where the voices of autistic people are heard and valued. 

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