This post is by Víctor Verdejo, one of the editors – together with José Luis Bermúdez and Matheus Valente – of the collection Sharing Thoughts: Philosophical Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Communication, recently published with Oxford University Press. He is a philosopher of mind and language, Ramón y Cajal fellow at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, and currently leads a number of research projects on communication, intersubjectivity and the self. More information can be found here.
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| Cover of Sharing Thoughts |
Well, it might be hard for you to know without further context, and in particular, without me telling you what that could be. But this way of talking certainly illustrates how natural and easy it is to consider the possibility of shared thoughts.
We are all used to the idea that thoughts, ideas and experiences can be talked about, expressed and ultimately shared with our peers. And the force of this idea not only sits deeply with a common-sense conception of communication, but is also one powerfully voiced in the work of contemporary and modern authors. John Locke puts it into words when he contends that uttered words “stand as marks for the ideas within [one’s] own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men’s minds be conveyed from one to another” (Essay concerning Human Understanding, III, chap. 1, §2).
Yet it is probably Gottlob Frege the one author that is fairly considered to be the philosophical flagship of the possibility and necessity of thought sharing. There is no doubt – Frege contends – that mankind “has a common stock of thoughts”. And such an asset, such priceless inventory seems indeed indispensable for mutual understanding, common knowledge and human science.
This grand vision is therefore compelling, and has set the course for philosophical accounts of communication and rationality. But are we really entitled to the picture of thoughts as things that, as it were, flow unaltered between minds and speakers? Is this not a way of glossing over unmistakable differences in the way we act and think?
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| Víctor Verdejo |
Kit Fine is often seen as one leading figure in most contemporary treatments of alternatives to the Fregean picture in communication and reasoning. According to Fine, thought communication or coordination is better accounted for in terms of the relations to which different thoughts stand in a context. We can thus take Frege and Fine – the “two Fs” as the introduction to the book phrases it – as illustrating a foundational confrontation. Yet, whatever the options, it is clear that we tread a distinctively Fregean theme. In the year marking the 100th anniversary of his death, Sharing Thoughts is an unspoken tribute to one influential strand of Frege’s work.
The landscape of options can thus here be drawn in terms of a profound divide between those who think that thoughts can and are typically shared in communication, and those who seek rewarding alternatives that put on sharp relief the richness of the ways in which our thoughts actually differ from one another when we successfully communicate or reason together. In the latter case, and as Aidan Gray aptly puts it in his piece, we think the “same-ish” rather than literally the same. This book provides a representative compendium of the available choices on both counts in its first and second parts, respectively.
For instance, we can share non-conceptual thoughts through music (Peacocke), or share thoughts in the context of a particular common (social) practice or environment (Dickie, Schroeter and Schroeter, Sawyer), or share thoughts in special, complex ways given their unique, egocentric nature (especial mention here deserves the first-person concept) (Prosser). We might also want to explore the senses in which we can be said to actually think together (Longworth), the criteria that can be used to individuate shared thoughts (Recanati) or the ways in which we may differ attitudinally from one another even when our beliefs are indeed the same (Bermúdez). In all these cases, a richer or heightened sense of sharing ensues.
But we might also take communication and thought coordination relevant to communication or reasoning to be ultimately explained by something entirely different, a kind of relation in which our thoughts might stand to one another. These include belief, knowledge and similarity relations that are compatible with huge variability from the point of view of the mental states of otherwise smoothly interacting subjects. This option might include but does not entail the literal sharing of thoughts. In that case, the onus would be to provide a satisfactory account of what that relation is supposed to be if not identity. The range of options include presuppositions of coreference (García-Carpintero), information-based models (Onofri), or other “transactional requirements” (Goodman) which stand in peculiar logical relations (Gray).
The discussion of alternatives makes plain that the intersubjectivity of thought encompasses a good assortment of different phenomena which include (dis)agreement, belief change, the transmission of knowledge, information, and public debate. Communication links up and overlaps with a range of issues which might require specific treatments. Along the way, staunch and classic rivalries also emerge in the context of the discussion are revisited – like those concerning externalism (Sawyer) and holism (Pollock). As a result, the playing field is both broadened and deepened in ways that invite further inquiry.
So, are you thinking what I am thinking?
Perhaps not, or not completely. Or yes in ways to be spelled out. But whatever the precise answer, and as Sharing Thoughts abundantly illustrates, this is an incredibly fertile question and there is quite a lot to be said about how to better understand this possibility and the role it plays in communication and intersubjective thought.