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The Benefits of Doing Philosophy

This post is by Anna Mameli, who attends secondary school and volunteers for The Philosophy Garden as part of her Duke of Edinburgh silver award. Anna reports on a paper recently published in a special issue of Revue Internationale de Philosophie on philosophy in the public sphere.


Conceptual plumbing, an installation at the Philosophy Museum


What are employers looking for? What do you need to successfully pass an interview? What helps you to win debates? Good epistemic skills. Epistemic skills allow you to gain, develop and use knowledge so that you can achieve your goals.

This can be applied anywhere, from expressing your view in passionate debates in comment sections and discussing political issues with friends to deciding whether or not you should trust a source (e.g., when looking for medical advice) and convincingly presenting your point at work. These skills can be used for anything in your life! Learning good epistemic habits is essential for surviving in our society. So, how do you gain, practice and develop these skills? 


The Trolley problem game (Philosophy Museum)


In “Philosophy for and by Everyone: How Doing Philosophy Supports Epistemic Agency", Lisa Bortolotti, Anna Ichino, and Matteo Mameli explore, explain and discuss how “doing philosophy” can enhance your ability as an epistemic agent. This paper highlights the success and importance of public philosophy, especially in promoting epistemic virtues and agency. 

It goes without saying that the phrase “doing philosophy” is itself ambiguous and controversial, but by reference to both performance and productivity, this paper shows how “doing philosophy” can be not only fulfilling but also useful in many different contexts. This is shown in public philosophy: practising philosophy can both help you achieve goals successfully (such as analysing the truth in a claim) and bring you satisfaction while enhancing your epistemic skills.


A scene from The Ant the Grasshopper (The Philosophy Garden)


This paper thoroughly covers and analyses different views and approaches to the success of public philosophy compared to academic philosophy and highlights the benefits of philosophy as a subject to study. It also gives substantial examples of bringing philosophy and epistemic skills to the public. 

The first example is The Philosophy Museum, which was founded, as the first of its kind, by philosophers at the University of Milan, led by Anna Ichino, Clotilde Calabi and Paolo Spinicci. These philosophers created a sanctuary for the public to explore, grow and develop their analytical and epistemic skills. Using various interactive games, videos, and other resources, the museum helps visitors learn key tools philosophers use and develop important skills. The museum exhibitions had a visitor satisfaction rate of over 80%.


Chiara Brozzo leads a session on aesthetics at Winterbourne House and Garden
 using one of The Philosophy Garden videos.

The other example is a collection of digital resources, founded by Lisa Bortolotti and developed with the assistance of other researchers at the University of Birmingham, called The Philosophy Garden. The garden provides free access to various resources that help build and practise significant skills. From fun interactive games and child-friendly videos to access to papers and other content and a collection of talks, the Philosophy Garden can be enjoyed by people of all ages, and invites interesting discussions on timely topics (such as how successful democratic practices are). Sessions with primary and secondary school students received excellent feedback from teachers.


Exhibition on conspiracy theories
and fake news at the Philosophy Museum

To conclude, the paper further analyses and delves into the different epistemic virtues and practices that are vital in everyday life and are enhanced by public philosophy, such as creativity and inquisitiveness.


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