Skip to main content

Neural Correlates of the Optimism Bias

Bojana Kuzmanovic
My name is Bojana Kuzmanovic, I am a postdoctoral researcher working in an interdisciplinary setting at the Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine at the Jülich Research Centre in Germany. I am a cognitive neuroscientist/psychologist by training and my work focuses on person perception and emotional influences on decision making. Here I am going to discuss recent work on the emotional value of self-related optimistic belief updates.

Recently, Anneli Jefferson reported a behavioral study investigating the optimism bias by using a belief update paradigm inspired by Sharot et al. (2011). The findings show that when confronted with new information, people adjusted their initial risk estimates for undesirable future events to a greater extent when this information supported more positive outlooks than when it suggested a higher risk for future hazards (Kuzmanovic et al., under revision). Moreover, this asymmetry in updating was greater for judgments relating to oneself than for those relating to similar others, and was moderated by individual differences in trait optimism.


While this result shows that a biased use of information provides individuals with a way of maintaining optimism in the face of conflicting evidence, thereby protecting them from unwelcome expectations, the purely behavioural study does not tell us much about what mechanisms underlie the differential information use we see in the optimism bias. We learn little about the exact psychological process underlying judgement formation. Theoretical accounts assume that both cognitive and motivational mechanisms underlie optimistic thinking and reasoning, but empirical evidence is scarce. These covert processes can be elucidated by using functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify brain regions that are specifically involved in forming optimistically biased judgements.

Optimism
The study by Sharot and colleagues (2011) provided initial insights into the neural correlates of the optimism bias. However, their finding concerned the correlation between neural activity and estimation errors (the difference between participants’ estimates and the presented base rates), and revealed only cortical brain regions associated with complex cognitive processing. In order to demonstrate that parts of the reward neural network are involved as well, as one would expect if motivational processes guide optimistic judgments, we applied a different analysis (Kuzmanovic et al., in preparation).

We expected that the outcome of the update itself, and not only the consideration of estimation errors, should have an affective value for the judging subject. Specifically, we expected that updates after desirable information resulting in more positive future outlooks would be associated with pleasure, but not so updates after undesirable information leading to more negative future outlooks. Thus, we correlated the whole brain activity with the size of updates in the course of the experiment separately for desirable and undesirable information and for estimations relating to self and other. The main finding was that the activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) increased both with larger favourable updates and with smaller unfavourable updates. The involvement of this region therefore reflects the positive value of a favourable future outlook that is generated both by large updates after desirable information and refraining from updates after undesirable information. In good accordance with this finding, the vmPFC has been consistently associated with the subjective value of emotional stimuli and rewards in previous studies (D'Argembeau, 2013; Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Winecoff et al., 2013).

The differential activity pattern in the vmPFC thus supports the assumption that optimistic expectations towards the future entail a hedonic value that may interact with and influence other domains of cognition leading to differential information use within the judgment formation.


References

D'Argembeau, A. (2013). On the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in self-processing: the valuation hypothesis. Front Hum Neurosci 7, 372.

Kuzmanovic, B., Jefferson, A., Timmermanns, B., and Vogeley, K. (in preparation). Ventromedial prefrontal activity reflects the emotional value of self-related optimistic belief updates.

Kuzmanovic, B., Jefferson, A., and Vogeley, K. (under revision). Self-specific optimism bias in belief updating is associated with high trait optimism. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making.

Levy, D.J., and Glimcher, P.W. (2012). The root of all value: a neural common currency for choice. Curr Opin Neurobiol 22, 1027-1038.

Sharot, T., Korn, C.W., and Dolan, R.J. (2011). How unrealistic optimism is maintained in the face of reality. Nat Neurosci 14, 1475-1479.

Winecoff, A., Clithero, J.A., Carter, R.M., Bergman, S.R., Wang, L., and Huettel, S.A. (2013). Ventromedial prefrontal cortex encodes emotional value. J Neurosci 33, 11032-11039.

Popular posts from this blog

Delusions in the DSM 5

This post is by Lisa Bortolotti. How has the definition of delusions changed in the DSM 5? Here are some first impressions. In the DSM-IV (Glossary) delusions were defined as follows: Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.

Rationalization: Why your intelligence, vigilance and expertise probably don't protect you

Today's post is by Jonathan Ellis , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Public Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Eric Schwitzgebel , Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. This is the first in a two-part contribution on their paper "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical thought" in Moral Inferences , eds. J. F. Bonnefon and B. Trémolière (Psychology Press, 2017). We’ve all been there. You’re arguing with someone – about politics, or a policy at work, or about whose turn it is to do the dishes – and they keep finding all kinds of self-serving justifications for their view. When one of their arguments is defeated, rather than rethinking their position they just leap to another argument, then maybe another. They’re rationalizing –coming up with convenient defenses for what they want to believe, rather than responding even-handedly to the points you're making. Yo

A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind

Today's post is by  Karen Yan (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) on her recent paper (co-authored with Chuan-Ya Liao), " A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind " ( Synthese 2023). Karen Yan What drives us to write this paper is our curiosity about what it means when philosophers of mind claim their works are informed by empirical evidence and how to assess this quality of empirically-informedness. Building on Knobe’s (2015) quantitative metaphilosophical analyses of empirically-informed philosophy of mind (EIPM), we investigated further how empirically-informed philosophers rely on empirical research and what metaphilosophical lessons to draw from our empirical results.  We utilize scientometric tools and categorization analysis to provide an empirically reliable description of EIPM. Our methodological novelty lies in integrating the co-citation analysis tool with the conceptual resources from the philosoph