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Fear, Vaccine Hesitancy and Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Beliefs

Today's post is by Daniel Jolley, Lee Shepherd and Anna Maughan. Here they talk about their interesting research on vaccine hesitancy and anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, based on their recent paper in Psychology and Health.

Daniel Jolley

There are different conspiracy theories about vaccines. For example, some conspiracy theories suggest vaccines may be unsafe or ineffective. However, this is being hidden by pharmaceutical companies for profit. Other vaccine conspiracy theories suggest vaccines may be being used to control the population. In our latest research, we looked at what influences these conspiracy beliefs. 

In three experimental studies, we explored how fear may influence people’s willingness to receive a vaccine. We also looked at how fear influences anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs. We initially thought that fear would increase conspiracy beliefs, leading to people being less willing to receive a vaccine. However, the results from the first two studies (Studies 1a and 1b) were mixed and did not strongly support this idea. Instead, we considered a different explanation. Based on recent studies, we tested if fear directly causes vaccine hesitancy, and conspiracy beliefs emerge as a way to justify avoiding vaccines. Studies 1a and 1b consistently supported this alternative idea. 

Study 2 further tested this by influencing participants' vaccination intentions under high fear. The results showed that fear and considering not to vaccinate (versus vaccinate) reduced people’s willingness to receive a vaccine. This, in turn, was associated with greater anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs. Our key finding is that fear of vaccines directly reduces people's intention to get vaccinated. When people feel hesitant about vaccines due to fear, they could be more likely to adopt conspiracy beliefs as a way to justify their unwillingness to get vaccinated. 

Lee Shepherd

These findings highlight the crucial role of emotions, especially fear, in shaping attitudes toward vaccines and the emergence of conspiracy beliefs. Understanding this emotional component can help design more effective public health strategies to increase vaccine uptake. Based on our research, we recommend the following:
  • Address Emotional Drivers: Public health campaigns should address the emotional aspects of vaccine hesitancy. Finding ways to reduce fear may make people less likely to believe conspiracy theories.
  • Effective Emotion Management: It is important to develop and promote strategies to help people manage their emotions. People can manage their emotions in different ways. Some of these ways are more beneficial than others. It is important to help people find beneficial ways to manage their fear towards vaccines. 
  • Target Fear Specifically: Interventions should focus on reducing fear related to vaccines. This could involve providing reassuring information about vaccine safety and efficacy. Information could also address common fears and share positive vaccination stories. 

Anna Maughan

Overall, we show that fear may lead to people being less willing to receive a vaccine. This may then increase vaccine conspiracy beliefs. We argue that public health initiatives should focus on the emotional roots of vaccine hesitancy and conspiracy beliefs. This is likely to be effective in encouraging vaccination and safeguarding public health. Addressing fear, in particular, can reduce the tendency to justify vaccine avoidance with conspiracy theories and help build a more trusting and well-informed society.

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