This post is by Maja Kittel, formerly known as Maja Białek, a philosopher of psychiatry working at the Faculty of Philosophy and Cognitive Science of the University of Białystok. Maja focuses on the epistemic properties of delusions and is currently conducting empirical qualitative research on the content of delusions (for details, click here). Maja recently published a paper entitled: “The epistemic innocence of elaborated delusions re-examined” in the Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
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| Maja Kittel |
Epistemic innocence is the idea, put forth by Lisa Bortolotti and collaborators, that although certain beliefs seem epistemically costly, they sometimes bring more epistemic benefit than harm and thus deserve absolution. For example, a monothematic delusion that helps an individual understand their difficult and frightening experiences may be judged as epistemically innocent because, although it is false and fixed, it serves as an imperfect, temporary crutch, helping the person remain an active epistemic agent. What I disagree with Bortolotti about is that this status can also be granted to elaborated delusions.
Elaborated delusions, as we both seem to understand them, are associated with schizophrenia and stem from disturbances of self, often concerning the way the inner world of the person with schizophrenia merges uncontrollably with their external environment. I argue that delusions of this kind, although not without their benefits, cause a specific kind of deep harm that undermines all their good work, and that they should not qualify as epistemically innocent, although they do adhere to the extant definition. Because I think the concept of epistemic innocence is well worth preserving, I also propose how to reformulate it to exclude this type of beliefs.
To explain the deep harm caused by elaborated delusions, I employ the psychiatric concept of double bookkeeping, where a person experiencing delusions can remain in contact with both their delusional reality and shared epistemic reality. I flesh out this notion of shared epistemic reality by invoking the enactive idea of sensus communis, which involves not only sharing or trading beliefs with other epistemic agents but also joint interaction with the physical environment experienced as a shared material reality. Any epistemic benefit that could possibly be gained can only be achieved by participating in the sensus communis (or, alternatively, in a shared Wittgensteinian network of sensus communes) with other agents.
A delusional belief typically doesn’t belong in an epistemic agent’s sensus communis; it is neither shared nor even understood. However, if I believe an isolated delusional belief that allows me to deal with difficult experiences in the best way available to me, it can ultimately help me remain mostly grounded in my shared reality thanks to double bookkeeping.
This only works, though, if I can flexibly switch between the two “books”. Delusions that undermine the belief that there is even a stable difference between "me" and "the shared reality," and that further weaken my sense of being grounded in any reality, both reflect and compound the disturbance of my deepest sense of self, ultimately preventing any epistemic benefit. Thus, they can't be judged as epistemically innocent.
This is why I propose that the chief criterion for epistemic innocence, the criterion of epistemic benefit, should state that an epistemically beneficial belief should help me remain within my sensus communis. Moreover, it should also be necessary for this purpose – this is to eliminate beliefs that are trivial or devoid of informational value. I believe that this new definition helps preserve a useful notion but prevents overextending it to truly problematic beliefs.