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Too Mad to Be True III

This post is by Helene Cæcilie Mørck (MA), academic, expert by experience and choreographer, who recently attended and talked at Too Mad to Be True III: Paradoxes of Madness, held on October 30–31, 2024, at the Dr. Guislain Museum in Ghent, Belgium. The conference was organised by Jasper Feyaerts (Ghent University), Bart Marius (Director of the Dr. Guislain Museum), and Wouter Kusters (Foundation for Psychiatry & Philosophy). 


Opening speech by Jasper Feyaerts (Ghent University)

This year’s theme explored the notion of contradiction and paradox in madness, philosophy, and related fields. With over 60 speakers, including five keynote presenters, the conference offered a remarkable diversity of perspectives that challenged conventional understandings of madness. Despite the breadth of content and the tight two-day schedule, the experience was intense, deeply enriching, and empowering. 

Many speakers lived with or had personal experiences of madness, bringing an invaluable first-hand dimension to their insights. Their contributions spanned a variety of disciplines, including philosophy, psychiatry, the arts such as music, choreography, filmmaking, writing, and cartooning to mention a few, Mad Studies, Mad activism, queer and trans studies, psychology, social sciences, medical anthropology, and independent voices. This multidisciplinary and lived-experience-driven approach lent the conference a unique vibrancy and authenticity.

This quote from Sofia Jeppsson’s presentation encapsulates a recurring thread that ran through many of the talks: “Psychosis patients make holes in reality.” Viewed through a Mad perspective, this idea invites us to reconsider madness as a transformative force—one that critiques, reshapes, and interacts with the boundaries of what we call "reality." Far from being purely destructive, psychosis and other forms of madness can disrupt stagnant or rigid structures, creating opportunities for creativity and transformation. 

These "holes" in reality can be seen as openings—gaps through which new ways of understanding, perceiving, and imagining might emerge. Experiencing madness, as many of the speakers demonstrated, can offer profound insights and perspectives that are inaccessible to others. Here is a glimpse of some of the talks the speakers presented.


Julia MacIntosh’s talk, "Learning to Love Mad Reality"


Julia MacIntosh’s talk, From “and/or” to “both/and” – Learning to Love Mad Reality, explored how madness intertwines with consensual reality. She emphasised, “Madness isn’t another realm; it is deeply intertwined with consensual reality,” challenging the binary view that separates the two. 

Michael Dickson, in his presentation Living with the Paradox of Delusion, framed certain delusions as generating paradoxes. He argued that individuals experiencing delusions often have good reasons to hold them, and advocated for adopting intellectual humility, which involves grounding rationality in accepting both the delusion and its denial. 

In Sabina Wantoch's contribution, The Ouroboros of Mad Experience and the Neoliberal University, which was a performative presentation combining story-telling and poetry, they explored the paradoxes with the experience of writing a PhD on madness, whilst trained in and in constant struggle with analytic philosophy, at the neoliberal university. 

In Lorna Collins' presentation, Being Psychotic: Madness as Vulnerability and Power, she talked about her lived experiences of having organic psychosis which leads her to have continuous hallucinations. She spoke of her infinite creativity and how her hallucinations enabled rather than disabled her, even when they were violent and destructive.

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