First Workshop in the Philosophy of Psychiatry in Chile

The first ever academic event in Chile completely devoted to the philosophy of psychiatry took place on the 16th April in Valparaíso. The I Workshop in Philosophy of Psychiatry was led by Professor Pablo López-Silva and organized by the Universidad de Valparaíso School of Psychology and the Valparaíso Institute of Complex Systems.

Poster of the event

The event gathered an interdisciplinary audience of 60 people around the work of 8 local and international researchers in the field. The Keynote Speech was given by Dr Renato Matoso, Director of the Department of Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

In his talk, "Psychotic, Psychedelic, and Religious Experiences: What Can We Learn from Their Joint Study?", Matoso discussed a number of phenomenological and mechanistic similarities found in psychotic, psychedelic, and religious experiences. Matoso proposed to understand these three types of experiences as a continuum where differences can be explained by background knowledge, sociocultural scaffoldings, and particular elements at the mechanistic level. The talk also examined how the structure of psychedelic and religious experiences could enlighten the exploration of therapeutic approaches to psychosis.

During the event, Pablo López-Silva launched the first stage of the Latin American Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry. This initiative is mean to gather researchers in the region in order to foster collaborative projects, education, and public outreach and it is supported by the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry, and the Oxford’s Collaborating Centre for Value-Based Research.

Participants in the workshop

The I Workshop in Philosophy of Psychiatry is the result of a growing interest in the philosophy of psychiatry in the region, and it is meant to be the first in a series of annual workshops that will continue to foster dialogue, collaboration, and the consolidation of a robust academic community around these themes in Latin America.

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