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Measuring Linguistic Inequality

This post is by Charlotte Gauvry and Uwe Peters. Introducing themes of their recent paper "Epistemic Challenges Faced by Non-native English Speakers in Philosophy: Evidence from an International Survey" published in Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Charlotte is a teaching and research associate at Univerity of Bonn and Uwe is an assistant professor at Utrecht University. 

 

Charlotte Gauvry

The English language now dominates analytic philosophy. This has extensive benefits for international collaboration and communication. But does it also create unfair inequalities for non-native English speakers in the field?

Things could be relatively fair if non-native English speakers with university-level English proficiency needed roughly the same amount of time to read, write, and prepare talks in English as native English speakers do. After all, in student essay grading, hiring decisions, journal reviewing, and so on, it is widely implicitly assumed that both groups face comparable linguistic demands. If that assumption were correct, there would be little reason to introduce compensatory measures to ensure equal opportunity. However, in a recent multilingual global survey of over 1,600 philosophers (including philosophy students), we found that this assumption is likely false. Analyzing participants’ responses by English proficiency and controlling for academic position and other relevant variables, we found that non-native English speakers with university admission-level English proficiency needed nearly twice as long as native English speakers to read articles and prepare presentations in English.

Moreover, even among non-native English speakers with the highest levels of English proficiency, the odds of facing English-related manuscript rejections, receiving negative teaching feedback, avoiding attending or asking questions at philosophy events in English, or feeling ridiculed because of their English were significantly higher than for native speakers. In some cases, they were three to nine times higher.

I (Charlotte) can relate, as I am often self-conscious about a potential bias against my French accent, fearing it may weaken the perceived substance of my presentations. It takes me additional mental efforts to monitor my English grammar and pronunciation. I also often find small talk, humour, or post-conference social exchanges – which are important for networking and collaborations – difficult, and I form social bonds more easily with other non-native English speakers who share similar struggles.


Uwe Peters


Maybe non-native English speakers should simply try harder and immerse themselves more fully in English? This response overlooks an important trade-off. In our survey, 88% of non-native English speakers reported that increasing exposure to English reduced their ability to discuss philosophy in their native language. Diminished ‘philosophical fluency’ in one’s first language can affect one’s intellectual identity and reduce the diversity of philosophical discourse. Relatedly, for instance, for a French scholar working in analytic philosophy, say, at a German university, the dominance of and exposure to English may make it harder to become more fluent in German and join German academic discussions.

In philosophy, where progress often depends heavily on discussion, critical questioning, and the open exchange of ideas, these challenges for non-native English speakers are not trivial. They directly affect who speaks, who is heard, and which ideas receive scrutiny and development. When linguistic anxiety leads systematically to reduced participation, the resulting epistemic loss is not merely individual but collective. These burdens of non-native English speakers can be largely invisible to gatekeepers in the field of philosophy. We hope that measuring and highlighting them helps improve this situation. 

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