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The Philosophy of Suicide

This post is by Michael Cholbi and Paolo Stellino. Michael Cholbi is Professor and Personal Chair in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and author of Suicide: The Philosophical Dimension and Grief: A Philosophical Guide. Paolo Stellino is a researcher at the NOVA University of Lisbon, and author of Philosophical Perspectives on Suicide: Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein.

They have recently published The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Suicide with Oxford University Press. 

Michael Cholbi

According to the World Health Organization (2023), suicide results in nearly eight hundred thousand deaths per year globally, nearly twice the number who die due to homicide. Global rates of suicide have declined in most parts of the world over the past generation, but there are some notable outliers where rates have increased. Some governments and health authorities have developed smartphone apps or partnered with social media platforms such as Facebook to monitor individuals’ posts and texts for language associated with suicidal thinking. This enhanced attention to identifying suicide’s causes and strategies for its prevention co-exists with greater interest in liberalizing assisted suicide laws or practices, especially for those with fatal or incurable illnesses. Indeed, legislation or judicial review related to assisted dying is active in nations as disparate as Ireland, Japan, South Africa, and Portugal.

Clearly then, suicide is a perennial subject of philosophical interest, but also one with a great deal of contemporary currency. And while multi-disciplinarity is essential in the study of suicide, some of the key questions concerning suicide are unavoidably philosophical: Can suicide be, in certain situations, morally permissible (or even morally obligatory)? Can it be a rational choice? What are our obligations toward suicidal individuals? And how should we even define suicide? The newly published Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Suicide (Oxford University Press, 2025) aims to amalgamate research that pursues these questions. The volume also brings needed attention to how suicide has been addressed in marginalized philosophical traditions, and expands the frontier of philosophical discourse concerning suicide to include heretofore neglected ethical and social aspects of suicide.

Paolo Stellino

The Handbook, which represents the first attempt to investigate suicide in all of its philosophical facets, is divided into three main parts: 

1) Suicide in Philosophical Traditions: The main goal of this part is to present a critical and updated overview of the most important historical philosophical approaches to suicide. The order of the chapters is chronological and the most relevant developments of Western thought in relation to suicide have been described.

2) Foundational Issues: The second part of the volume is dedicated to explore fundamental theoretical issues concerning suicide. The authors of the chapters contained in this part explore questions such as: how should “suicide” be defined? Should suicide be morally allowed in specific situations? What do the main normative ethical theories have to say about this? Is there a moral right and even a moral duty to suicide? And what are the criteria, if any, for a rational suicide?

3) Suicide in Practice: The last part of the volume is devoted to philosophical issues related to more practical and applied issues concerning suicide such as suicide prevention, assisted suicide, suicide and mental illness, and new suicide technologies. Also, in this part of the handbook authors examine less explored topics such as suicide and non-suicidal self-injury, suicide and grief, suicide as a protest, suicide tourism, suicide and media ethics, suicide in the moving image, and suicide and gender.

Each essay can be read on its own and provides a rich and useful bibliography on the topic area. At the same time, however, the handbook is designed to provide the best introduction to the field of philosophy of suicide. 

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