Skip to main content

Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame


On today’s post, Sebastian Schmidt, a senior researcher at the University of Zurich, discusses the value of truth in our interpersonal relationships. His research focuses on the interpersonal dimensions of epistemology, particularly questions of responsibility and epistemic normativity. 


Sebastian Scmidt

 
We would sometimes be better off with beliefs for which we lack sufficient evidence. Many people think that there is not sufficient evidence for God’s existence but that believing in God would make their life feel much more meaningful. Or consider the Dunning-Krueger effect: we often have higher confidence in our own abilities than our evidence warrants. Such overconfidence could make us more successful in our projects. Or imagine someone who is terminally ill but would live longer only if they believed against their evidence that they will recover. Surely, they would have every right to believe this. Or do they?

Epistemologists have traditionally analysed such cases as follows: from an epistemic point of view, believing on insufficient evidence is impermissible. From a practical point of view, however, people should do what they can to acquire beneficial beliefs, even if these beliefs are epistemically irrational.

Recently, this analysis has puzzled many philosophers. What is the point of saying that someone is epistemically not permitted to believe something while granting that believing it has enormous practical benefits? Who cares about the epistemic credentials of belief when ignoring the evidential situation makes life better in particular cases? Doxastic dilemmas raise the question of why truth and evidence should matter to us.

In this paper, I first spell out this challenge in detail. I then argue against two views that oppose the traditional analysis, thereby defending the distinctive value of truth for our interpersonal relations. I do so by drawing on the recent literature on epistemic blame.

First, I argue that if we systematically violate epistemic norms for practical gain, we turn ourselves into agents that cannot be epistemically trusted. That is, if we systematically violate epistemic norms, we are gullible or dogmatic. Since our violations of epistemic norms co-constitute our epistemic character, they affect how others ought to relate to us epistemically.

Consider an example. Dogmatic Dan’s community accepts him only if he disregards scientific evidence about anthropogenic climate change. Given the high social costs of social exclusion, it is practically reasonable for Dan to adopt his community’s irrational belief-forming practices. Consequently, he forms irrational beliefs that manifest dogmatism: he disregards scientists’ testimony whom he knows to be more reliable than members of his community.

Dan faces a doxastic dilemma. His practical reasons require him to deny scientific evidence, since leaving his community is not feasible. Yet epistemic norms require him to acknowledge that evidence. Since he does not comply with legitimate expectations to believe rationally, we judge that he cannot be trusted to think as he ought. He is thus epistemically blameworthy. 

Second, I argue that doxastic dilemmas are, in a sense, irresolvable. We cannot simply weigh our epistemic reasons against our practical reasons to determine what to believe, all things considered. Attempts in doing so obscure the interpersonal significance of Dan’s epistemic mistake. To appreciate why his dogmatism rightly matters to others, we must recognise the epistemic as a distinctive normative domain. We must resist the urge to find a resolution of doxastic dilemmas. Only by doing so can we properly acknowledge the significance of distinctly epistemic evaluation for our interpersonal relations.

For further discussion of Sebastian’s paper, you can read Benjamin Kiesewetter’s review here.

Popular posts from this blog

Delusions in the DSM 5

This post is by Lisa Bortolotti. How has the definition of delusions changed in the DSM 5? Here are some first impressions. In the DSM-IV (Glossary) delusions were defined as follows: Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.

Rationalization: Why your intelligence, vigilance and expertise probably don't protect you

Today's post is by Jonathan Ellis , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Public Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Eric Schwitzgebel , Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. This is the first in a two-part contribution on their paper "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical thought" in Moral Inferences , eds. J. F. Bonnefon and B. Trémolière (Psychology Press, 2017). We’ve all been there. You’re arguing with someone – about politics, or a policy at work, or about whose turn it is to do the dishes – and they keep finding all kinds of self-serving justifications for their view. When one of their arguments is defeated, rather than rethinking their position they just leap to another argument, then maybe another. They’re rationalizing –coming up with convenient defenses for what they want to believe, rather than responding even-handedly to the points you're making. Yo...

Models of Madness

In today's post John Read  (in the picture above) presents the recent book he co-authored with Jacqui Dillon , titled Models of Madness: Psychological, Social and Biological Approaches to Psychosis. My name is John Read. After 20 years working as a Clinical Psychologist and manager of mental health services in the UK and the USA, mostly with people experiencing psychosis, I joined the University of Auckland, New Zealand, in 1994. There I published over 100 papers in research journals, primarily on the relationship between adverse life events (e.g., child abuse/neglect, poverty etc.) and psychosis. I also research the negative effects of bio-genetic causal explanations on prejudice, and the role of the pharmaceutical industry in mental health. In February I moved to Melbourne and I now work at Swinburne University of Technology.  I am on the on the Executive Committee of the International Society for Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis and am the Editor...