On today’s post, Sebastian Schmidt, a senior researcher at the University of Zurich, discusses the value of truth in our interpersonal relationships. His research focuses on the interpersonal dimensions of epistemology, particularly questions of responsibility and epistemic normativity.
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| Sebastian Scmidt |
Epistemologists have traditionally analysed such cases as follows: from an epistemic point of view, believing on insufficient evidence is impermissible. From a practical point of view, however, people should do what they can to acquire beneficial beliefs, even if these beliefs are epistemically irrational.
Recently, this analysis has puzzled many philosophers. What is the point of saying that someone is epistemically not permitted to believe something while granting that believing it has enormous practical benefits? Who cares about the epistemic credentials of belief when ignoring the evidential situation makes life better in particular cases? Doxastic dilemmas raise the question of why truth and evidence should matter to us.
In this paper, I first spell out this challenge in detail. I then argue against two views that oppose the traditional analysis, thereby defending the distinctive value of truth for our interpersonal relations. I do so by drawing on the recent literature on epistemic blame.
First, I argue that if we systematically violate epistemic norms for practical gain, we turn ourselves into agents that cannot be epistemically trusted. That is, if we systematically violate epistemic norms, we are gullible or dogmatic. Since our violations of epistemic norms co-constitute our epistemic character, they affect how others ought to relate to us epistemically.
Consider an example. Dogmatic Dan’s community accepts him only if he disregards scientific evidence about anthropogenic climate change. Given the high social costs of social exclusion, it is practically reasonable for Dan to adopt his community’s irrational belief-forming practices. Consequently, he forms irrational beliefs that manifest dogmatism: he disregards scientists’ testimony whom he knows to be more reliable than members of his community.
Dan faces a doxastic dilemma. His practical reasons require him to deny scientific evidence, since leaving his community is not feasible. Yet epistemic norms require him to acknowledge that evidence. Since he does not comply with legitimate expectations to believe rationally, we judge that he cannot be trusted to think as he ought. He is thus epistemically blameworthy.
Second, I argue that doxastic dilemmas are, in a sense, irresolvable. We cannot simply weigh our epistemic reasons against our practical reasons to determine what to believe, all things considered. Attempts in doing so obscure the interpersonal significance of Dan’s epistemic mistake. To appreciate why his dogmatism rightly matters to others, we must recognise the epistemic as a distinctive normative domain. We must resist the urge to find a resolution of doxastic dilemmas. Only by doing so can we properly acknowledge the significance of distinctly epistemic evaluation for our interpersonal relations.
For further discussion of Sebastian’s paper, you can read Benjamin Kiesewetter’s review here.
