In today’s post, Monica A. Ross explores how medicalised interpretations can shape how a person is understood and who they are taken to be. Monica is a psychotherapist and Visiting Scholar at UC Berkeley, whose work focuses on psychiatric classification, clinical records, and narrative identity.
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| Monica A. Ross |
I am a psychotherapist with ten years of clinical experience. I have received several diagnoses over my lifetime, none of which adequately captures how I understand myself today.
Perhaps we are all mad in different ways, at different moments, and to different degrees, though the consequences of being understood that way are unevenly distributed.
People differ in how extensively their experiences are documented through psychiatric classifications and how closely they identify with them.
What happens when a medicalised interpretation becomes durable enough to function as a fact about who a person is? Clinicians, patients, and others who encounter medical records may come to treat an interpretation as fact because it appears in an authoritative document: a medical record, an assessment, an expert diagnosis, or an official history. The document carries authority through institutional practices that determine whose judgments are credible, how they are preserved, and how they inform subsequent decisions.
What began as a clinical interpretation can return looking different. Its origins may disappear while the authority of the record remains. Once documented, there can be an easy way in and a confusing way out.
As I have moved between states, I have encountered traces of earlier records and diagnoses in medical settings, yet reconstructing that history has proved difficult. But that is precisely the point: the history is scattered.
Pieces surface unexpectedly; at other times, professionals searching their systems find nothing. Practitioners have offered to correct records while I sat before them, yet neither of us could know where else they might persist.
My medical representation occupies a strange liminal place: neither fully present nor absent, neither recoverable as a coherent history nor entirely gone. A fragment may become actionable even when the circumstances surrounding the original interpretation are no longer visible. I do not necessarily think erasure is the answer.
When earlier clinical interpretations are incorporated into AI systems, they may be summarised, recombined, and presented as new findings without revealing the judgments on which they depend. An interpretation can thus influence subsequent decisions even when its original justification is no longer visible, making its authority harder to identify, contest, or revise.
Can an earlier interpretation lose its authority when new evidence or understandings emerge? If there is a way “in,” is there a way “out”? And out of what, exactly?
Terms such as illness and recovery can sound deceptively stable when they, too, are historically situated. To speak of being with or without mental illness may obscure the distinction between a person's condition and the clinical judgment through which it is understood.
Perhaps the harder question is whether institutions can preserve the history of a judgment without preserving its authority indefinitely. A diagnosis may remain in the record after the circumstances in which it was made have changed. But if the past continues to determine how the present is understood, what room remains for the individual to shape their future?
This is where it all began, remember? There was an individual who asked for help. Shouldn’t they have the final say in determining what is helpful in the life they are trying to live?
