This week's post is by Virginia Ballesteros, an assistant professor at the University of Valencia.
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| Virginia Ballesteros |
In contemporary theories of social cognition, autism is predominantly framed through cognitivist paradigms, such as "theory of mind" or "simulation theory". These frameworks treat social understanding as an individualistic, internalist epistemic puzzle: the challenge of knowing the inaccessible mental states of others from one's own isolated mind. From this perspective, autistic difficulties are construed as impairments in the cognitive faculties or neural machinery required to make the inferences or simulations needed to read the mental states of others.
In contrast, approaches rooted in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy aim not to solve this puzzle, but to dissolve it. From a Wittgensteinian standpoint, minds are not hidden, private entities; rather, emotions, intentions, and psychological states are visibly manifested in behavior, gestures, and shared, rule- governed practices. Grasping these manifestations requires participating in a shared "form of life". Consequently, the central inquiry shifts from cognitive deficits in mindreading to why autistic individuals experience difficulties participating in the shared form of life where meaning and social understanding are embedded.
In this critical review, I examine four prominent Wittgensteinian accounts of autism, analyzing their philosophical assumptions, conceptual coherence, and practical implications. The analysis begins with Peter Hobson, who argues that social understanding develops through affectively coordinated interpersonal relations enabled by innate, biologically rooted predispositions. Hobson characterizes autism as a biologically based impairment in these relational inclinations, preventing autistic individuals from entering humanity's universal, "given" form of life. I contend that, although Hobson articulates a Wittgensteinian account, his naturalistic inclinations lead him to establish a universal form of life rooted in neurotypical norms. By treating this form of life as given and largely unalterable, Hobson's model obscures how exclusionary social practices generate disability, ultimately reinforcing a traditional individual-deficit view.
In contrast, Ian Hacking offers a pluralistic approach. While acknowledging that autistic and non- autistic people typically lack an immediate mutual grasp of each other's expressions (Köhler’s phenomena), Hacking leaves room to improve mutual understanding by modifying our linguistic and social practices. I argue that Hacking’s view diverges fundamentally from Hobson’s because of his constitutive conception of language. Autistic autobiographies and online communities act as "artificial platforms" that reshape ordinary language. These communicative practices do not merely describe an existing condition; they actively forge new concepts, bridging interpersonal divides and expanding the human form of life toward greater mutual intelligibility and inclusion.
Robert Chapman proposes a more radical stance, framing autism as a distinct form of life. Drawing on the "double empathy problem" and aspect-blindness, Chapman argues that autistic difficulties stem from a mismatch between clashing neurotypical and autistic forms of life. I argue that Chapman’s proposal inadvertently lapses into an "internalist" framework: by characterizing autism itself as a form of life, it conceives of a form of life as an internal attribute possessed by individuals rather than a set of shared practices in which one participates. To retain Chapman’s anti-deficit insights without conceptual inconsistency, I suggest distinguishing between a singular, overarching "human form of life" and multiple, diverse "forms of human life" (including an autistic one).
Finally, Victoria McGeer’s "regulative view" conceives folk psychology as a mindshaping practice where individuals learn to regulate their thoughts and actions according to culturally shared norms. McGeer's emphasis on normativity is a double-edged sword: if norm-following demands rigid uniformity, it will inevitably cast autism in deficit terms; but if applied flexibly, it powerfully exposes the psychological harm inflicted on autistic individuals by ill-fitting neurotypical norms.
In conclusion, while all Wittgensteinian accounts grant a central role to social practices and the notion of a form of life, their underlying theoretical commitments yield markedly different conceptions and practical consequences for autism.