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World Mental Health Day 2015

In this post we shall report on some of the initiatives promoted by mental health charities to celebrate this year's World Mental Health Day and we will point to some resources from the blog that could be of interest. One of the objectives of project PERFECT is to undermine the theoretical foundations for the current stigma associated with mental illness and argue for the continuity between so-called 'normal' and 'abnormal' cognition, so we feel we are making a small contribution to progress in this area.

The Mind Charity has announced that on Mental Health Day the Duke and Duchess of Kent will participate in a special event, meeting young people who have faced mental health issues and now volunteer for Mind.

The Mental Health Foundation focuses this year on children's mental health issues, and raising the problem that children may find it particularly difficult to gather information or ask for help due to stigma. See the campaign poster below:




Rethink has launched a new film (you can watch it here) to promote awareness of the difficulties encountered by people with schizophrenia in particular, highlighting that most of them do not feel that they are receiving the support they need to feel better.

Sane is currently running a Black Dog campaign to raise awareness for depression, educate the public about mental health issues, demonstrate the importance of research, and ultimately change perceptions of mental illness in society.

And finally, here are some of our recent posts dealing with stigma:

Young People and Mental Health

Amy on Anxiety

Sadder but Wiser?

Pills, Poetry and Prose

The Definition of Mental Disorder

Understanding Psychosis

I hope you enjoy reading them, and participating in the many initiatives launched for this year's World Mental Health Day!



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